By Ephraim Agbo
On November 10, 2025, the White House hosted a visit that would have been unthinkable only a year earlier: U.S. President Donald Trump met Ahmad (Al-)Sharaa, the interim Syrian leader whose forces helped topple Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The meeting — the first visit by any Syrian head of state to Washington since Syria’s independence in 1946 — crystallised a rapid U.S. policy shift: Washington announced a 180-day suspension (a six-month waiver) of key sanctions tied to the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act and signalled moves to integrate Syria into an anti-ISIS multilateral framework and broader reconstruction conversations.
This post parses what happened, why it matters, and — crucially — the unanswered questions that will determine whether the visit becomes the opening of a genuine political reset or merely an expensive exercise in realpolitik with little protection for victims of the war.
The facts (compact): what changed — and what didn’t
- The White House meeting is historic in form and substance: a U.S. president received a Syrian head of state in Washington, and the discussions publicly ranged from counter-terrorism cooperation (bringing Syria into a coalition against ISIS) to sanctions relief and reconstruction.
- The U.S. Treasury announced a 180-day partial suspension of some Caesar-era sanctions; the administration framed this as a temporary—but substantive—gesture to test cooperation on terrorism and reconstruction while keeping sanctions tied to Russian and Iranian economic ties under scrutiny.
- Ahmad al-Sharaa’s biography matters: he rose to prominence as an armed rebel leader and has a complex past that includes associations with militant groups; Washington’s embrace therefore marks a high-stakes political calculation balancing counter-ISIS cooperation against concerns about legitimising former militants.
These are not trivial shifts. They represent a deliberate U-turn in diplomatic posture toward Damascus — from isolating sanctions designed to punish war crimes to conditional engagement that prioritises counter-terrorism and reconstruction.
Why the U.S. moved — motivations and realpolitik
Three pragmatic drivers explain this reversal:
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Immediate security utility (ISIS resurgence): Even after its territorial defeat, ISIS retains an ability to terrorise and to exploit instability. Washington has an incentive to close any permissive space in Syria by co-opting Damascus into counter-ISIS operations, intelligence-sharing and clearance of ungoverned areas. The White House framed the visit around precisely that objective.
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Leverage for broader regional deals: High-level meetings can be bargaining chips. For the U.S., conditional engagement can be used to pressure Syria on issues ranging from hostage cases to curbing Iran’s foothold; for Israel and Gulf states, thawing ties with Damascus could come with security guarantees the U.S. mediates. Reuters and AP reporting highlights U.S. hopes to use the visit to negotiate security arrangements and de-escalation, especially in southern Syria.
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Reconstruction carrots: Rebuilding Syria is an expensive, geopolitically freighted enterprise. The U.S. is signalling that economic incentives — from reconstruction money to investment flows — are possible tools to nudge political concessions. But investors demand certainty: temporary waivers do not create the long-term legal predictability capital needs.
In short: the U.S. is leveraging diplomatic recognition and temporary sanctions relief to extract cooperation on security while testing whether Damascus will make concrete concessions.
The Caesar Act is the bottleneck — legal, political, moral
The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (2019) is not merely symbolic; it codified sanctions designed to deter reconstruction deals that would reward those responsible for war crimes and to punish third parties (including Iranian and Russian actors) that prop up abusive actors in Syria. The law also constrains executive flexibility: while presidents can grant waivers, a complete repeal requires Congressional action.
Implication: A 180-day suspension buys time for diplomacy but leaves the central political constraint intact. Investors and foreign governments need durable legal clarity before funding large infrastructure and energy projects. Congress — where debate will be fierce — will be the ultimate arbiter of whether the U.S. moves from temporary relief to permanent removal.
Human rights, accountability and the risk of “impunity by diplomacy”
Perhaps the most consequential critique of Washington’s pivot is normative: can meaningful accountability co-exist with rapid reintegration?
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The Caesar Act’s core logic was to deny impunity: sanctions target those responsible for torture, mass detentions and other abuses. Suspending sanctions risks signalling that geopolitical bargains trump justice for victims. Critics fear a return to the old geopolitics that rewarded authoritarian stability over accountability.
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The case of Austin Tice (the American journalist abducted in Syria in 2012) is emblematic and politically potent. U.S. officials and the Tice family have long sought answers; recent reporting and intelligence leaks have alternately suggested he may have been held by the Assad apparatus or executed — claims that remain contested. Any reset with Damascus will be judged in Washington and beyond by whether it advances resolution for missing persons, detainees and victims. Without transparent cooperation on those cases, political rapprochement will look hollow to many.
Bottom line: Reconstruction without credible transitional justice mechanisms — credible investigations, prosecutions, reparations — risks creating a post-war settlement that consolidates abuse rather than redresses it.
Regional ripples: Iran, Russia, Turkey, Israel and the Kurds
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Iran and Russia: Both have been Syria’s principal patrons during the Assad era. The U.S. suspension explicitly keeps pressure on transactions that deepen Syrian–Iranian–Russian strategic integration. But a normalized Damascus may still need Russian and Iranian technical and security assistance. Managing this triangular diplomacy will be awkward and unpredictable.
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Turkey: Ankara’s concerns center on Kurdish forces and refugee flows. Any U.S. deal that alters the balance in northern Syria will require Turkish buy-in or active management to avoid renewed conflict.
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Israel: Jerusalem has opposed any entrenchment of hostile Iranian forces in southern Syria and will monitor U.S. guarantees closely. Reports suggest U.S. mediators are seeking security arrangements that reduce Israeli incentives for unilateral strikes.
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The Kurds: The fate of Kurdish forces and their political gains from the last decade remains uncertain. Will they be integrated into a national Syrian security arrangement, marginalised, or offered regional autonomy? The answers will determine whether any diplomatic reset is durable.
Domestic U.S. politics: Congress, constituencies, and messaging
Any prospect of permanent sanction relief faces a fraught path in Congress. Human-rights advocates, some Arab and Kurdish diaspora groups, and political opponents will scrutinise every concession. The administration’s argument — that temporary relief is a pragmatic tool to defeat ISIS and deliver humanitarian gains — must survive that political test. Expect hearings, demands for conditionality, and potential legislative riders.
The mechanics of “reconstruction” — what investors actually need
Investors don’t respond to headlines; they respond to predictable legal regimes, bankable contracts, insurance against political risk, and assurances that assets won’t be seized or sanctioned. A six-month waiver does not create that ecosystem. Key requirements for credible private sector engagement include:
- Clear, long-term sanction relief or narrow, transparent licensing frameworks.
- Robust anti-corruption and procurement oversight to prevent kleptocratic capture.
- Guarantees (international or multilateral) that protect projects from unilateral state seizure.
- Demonstrable security on the ground (rule of law, contract enforcement).
Without those, pledges of “reconstruction” will remain aspirational.
Policy options and red lines (recommendations for Western policymakers)
If the U.S. is determined to engage, prudence demands a sequence that balances urgency with justice:
- Phased engagement: Tie further sanctions relief to demonstrable steps (access to detention records, cooperation on missing persons, verified demobilisation of militias, independent investigations into alleged war crimes). Short waivers can be a bridge — not the destination.
- Multilateral architectures: Reconstruction must involve multilateral lenders and strict disbursement conditions. This dilutes single-actor influence and adds technical benchmarks.
- Accountability mechanisms: Support international or hybrid courts, independent fact-finding and reparations programs before large-scale reconstruction funds flow.
- Local reconciliation and minority protections: Prioritise local power-sharing, protections for minority communities, and social-contract dialogues (citizenship, rights, non-discrimination) to defuse sectarian tensions.
- Transparency and civil society inclusion: Ensure Syrian civil society, victim groups and diaspora communities are part of the reconstruction and political process to enhance legitimacy.
Conclusion: a pivot with promise — if tied to justice
The White House meeting with Ahmad al-Sharaa and the six-month sanctions suspension mark a dramatic rewiring of U.S. Syria policy. The potential upside is real: a coordinated push against ISIS, pathways for reconstruction that relieve humanitarian suffering, and a diplomatic opening that reduces regional friction.
But the downsides are grave if this becomes a one-way street to normalisation without accountability. Durable peace requires more than counter-terrorism cooperation and headline-grabbing summits; it requires transparent justice, protections for minorities and missing persons, and legal certainty for reconstruction that does not reward those implicated in mass abuses. The test of November’s visit will be measured not in photo opportunities, but in whether Washington — Congress, civil society and international partners — insist that political stabilisation proceed hand-in-hand with justice.
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