Saudi-backed forces are retreating towards Aden, the Houthis are consolidating their military advantage, and Iran is gaining strategic leverage from a conflict that threatens to extend Yemen’s instability far beyond its borders.
By Ephraim Agbo | World Politics and Geostrategy | November 16, 2026
In 2015, Saudi Arabia launched a military intervention in Yemen to prevent the Houthi movement from consolidating its control over the country and to stop an Iran-aligned armed group from establishing a powerful position on the kingdom's southern border. More than a decade later, the strategic contradiction confronting Riyadh is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore: the movement it intervened to defeat has survived, expanded its military capabilities and emerged as a significant threat to regional security and international shipping.
The latest developments are particularly revealing. Saudi-backed forces fighting on behalf of Yemen's internationally recognised government have withdrawn from positions around Bab el-Mandeb, the strategic maritime passage connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Their immediate priority is now the defence of Aden, the principal southern base of the government, as Houthi forces advance through strategically important areas and intensify pressure on the surrounding highlands.
The withdrawal followed a six-week counteroffensive intended to recover territory seized by the Houthis along the western coastline. Although government-aligned forces had initially retaken positions around Dhubab, they failed to dislodge the Houthis completely from the coastal area or recover the important port city of Mocha. The subsequent redeployment has effectively ended the campaign's immediate objectives and handed the Houthis another opportunity to consolidate their position.
But the significance of this development goes beyond a change in battlefield positions. Yemen's political fragmentation is increasingly becoming a source of geopolitical leverage for the Houthis. Their ability to exploit divisions among their opponents, threaten strategically important territory and project military pressure beyond Yemen's borders has transformed the country's civil war into a wider regional security problem.
Iran benefits from the pressure its Yemeni partners can exert on Saudi Arabia and other regional adversaries. Saudi Arabia faces renewed insecurity along its southern frontier. International shipping companies must reconsider the risks of operating near a maritime corridor that has already experienced repeated attacks. Meanwhile, Yemen's civilian population is being pushed deeper into displacement, deprivation and uncertainty.
The central question is no longer simply whether the Houthis can capture more territory. It is whether their opponents can prevent a divided and weakened Yemeni state from becoming a permanent platform for regional military pressure.
THE WITHDRAWAL THAT REVEALS THE WEAKNESS OF SAUDI-BACKED FORCES
On November 15, Yemen's Southern Armed Forces announced that they were redeploying from Dhubab airport and positions around Bab el-Mandeb, west of Taiz Governorate. Their stated justification was the need to strengthen other front lines, protect Aden and respond to the growing military threat. The announcement came after a counteroffensive launched approximately six weeks earlier to reverse Houthi advances along the western coast.
The campaign initially appeared to offer the government an opportunity to regain the initiative. Its forces retook important positions around Dhubab and attempted to push the Houthis away from the maritime approaches. However, they failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough. The Houthis retained positions along the coast, including around Mocha, while expanding pressure in other parts of the country.
The government was therefore confronted with a difficult military calculation: continue defending exposed coastal positions or redirect forces towards the protection of Aden and neighbouring areas. From a purely operational perspective, redeployment can be a legitimate military decision. An army cannot defend every position indefinitely, particularly when its forces are stretched across multiple fronts. But the strategic consequences are determined by what an opponent gains from the withdrawal.
In this case, Houthi forces moved into areas vacated by government-aligned troops, recovering territory that had recently been contested. The withdrawal also weakened the government's ability to maintain pressure along the western coast. Reuters reported that government forces had moved towards al-Suqyah, south of Dhubab, while continuing efforts to push the Houthis away from nearby coastal areas. The same reporting described significant Houthi advances in the highlands north of Aden and the growing pressure on government positions around Taiz. <Cite refs={["turn660801news15","turn660801search8"]}/>
The reversal has also raised questions about Saudi military leadership. On November 16, Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia had replaced the commander of its joint forces in Yemen following the latest setbacks. The timing reflects the seriousness of the battlefield situation, although a leadership change alone cannot resolve the political divisions weakening the forces Riyadh supports. <Cite refs={["turn660801news16"]}/>
The deeper problem is that the internationally recognised government does not command a single, cohesive national army capable of defending all its territory under one uncontested political authority. Its military partners include different formations with separate leadership structures, local interests and external relationships. Their opposition to the Houthis has not eliminated their disagreements over the future of Yemen.
That is a fundamental weakness. A coalition may possess considerable military resources but still struggle to coordinate if its members do not agree on what they are fighting to preserve.
ADEN, TAIZ AND BAB EL-MANDEB: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE WAR
The latest Houthi advances are best understood through the relationship between three strategically important locations: Aden, Taiz and Bab el-Mandeb. Aden is the principal southern base of the internationally recognised government. It is a major port city, an important administrative centre and the location from which the government has maintained its remaining political presence since losing Sana'a in 2014. Its defence is therefore essential. A serious Houthi advance towards Aden would threaten not only a major urban centre but also the government's ability to operate as a viable political authority.
Taiz occupies another critical position. Located between the western coastline and Yemen's southern highlands, it has remained a major centre of resistance to Houthi control. However, the city has experienced years of military pressure, restrictions on movement and a severe humanitarian crisis. Bab el-Mandeb is strategically important for a different reason. It connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea, providing the southern maritime gateway towards the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean.
These locations are connected through roads, highlands, coastal territory and military supply routes. Their importance is therefore not simply geographical. It is operational. Control of strategic highlands can allow a force to threaten roads and positions below. Pressure on supply routes can isolate military formations. Advances in one area can compel an opponent to divert resources from another.
This is why the Houthi pressure on the territory north of Aden matters even without a direct assault on the city itself. Reuters reported that Houthi forces had reached positions around Khor Omairh, approximately 100 kilometres west of Aden, while other reporting placed forces in different positions closer to the city. These are reported battlefield locations, not evidence that Aden has already fallen or is completely surrounded. <Cite refs={["turn660801news16","turn660801news2"]}/>
The broader implication is that the government must now defend several connected areas while operating with a divided military coalition. The Houthis do not necessarily need to capture Aden immediately to weaken the government. If they can threaten its approaches, disrupt reinforcement routes and maintain pressure on Taiz and the coastline, they can force their opponents into an increasingly difficult defensive position. Geography is therefore becoming a weapon in a conflict where political fragmentation has already weakened the government's capacity to respond.
HOW THE HOUTHIS BECAME A REGIONAL SECURITY ACTOR
The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, did not emerge as a regional military force overnight. Their rise is rooted in Yemen's internal political crisis, the weakness of state institutions and the failure of successive political arrangements to accommodate the country's competing interests.
The movement developed in northern Yemen from a religious and political revivalist current within the Zaydi Shia community. It fought several rounds of conflict against the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh before expanding its influence during the political upheaval that followed the 2011 uprising. In September 2014, Houthi forces seized Sana'a, the capital, and subsequently consolidated control over much of northwestern Yemen, including some of the country's most densely populated areas.
The internationally recognised government eventually lost control of the capital and retreated south. Saudi Arabia launched its military intervention in March 2015, bringing together regional partners in an attempt to reverse the Houthi takeover and restore the government. The intervention failed to achieve its principal objective. Despite years of air strikes and military operations, the Houthis remained entrenched. The war became a prolonged conflict in which neither side could impose a decisive outcome.
A UN-brokered truce in 2022 reduced large-scale fighting, but it did not settle the political dispute. Yemen remained divided between competing authorities, rival armed groups and external patrons. The latest escalation has demonstrated that a reduction in fighting should not be confused with the resolution of a conflict.
The Houthis have used the years of military confrontation to develop capabilities that extend beyond conventional territorial warfare. Their missile and drone systems, combined with their geographical position along the Red Sea, have given them the capacity to threaten targets and commercial traffic beyond the areas they govern.
This is an important feature of contemporary asymmetric warfare. A non-state armed movement does not need the conventional military resources of a state to influence international security. It can exploit geographical advantages, relatively inexpensive weapons and the vulnerability of commercial infrastructure to impose costs on stronger opponents. The Houthis have demonstrated this through attacks on international shipping and their involvement in the wider confrontation surrounding the Gaza war and the subsequent regional escalation.
Their influence, however, should not be confused with unlimited military power. They face economic, political and military constraints. Nor does their presence along the coastline mean they exercise complete control over Bab el-Mandeb. Their strategic advantage lies in the ability to threaten the passage, create uncertainty and force governments and commercial operators to take their capabilities seriously.
IRAN'S ADVANTAGE: STRATEGIC INFLUENCE WITHOUT DIRECT OCCUPATION
The Houthi advance has important implications for Iran's regional position. Tehran has developed relationships with armed movements and political actors across the Middle East. These relationships provide strategic depth and create additional pressure points for states that oppose Iranian influence. The Houthis are an important component of this wider network.
Iranian support has contributed to the movement's military capabilities, particularly in areas involving missiles, drones and other weapons systems. This support has helped the Houthis become a much more consequential military actor than their domestic economic resources alone would suggest. However, describing the movement as simply an Iranian proxy that acts on direct instructions from Tehran would be analytically inadequate.
The Houthis have their own leadership, political ambitions, domestic constituency and history of conflict with Yemen's rival factions. Their relationship with Iran is better understood as one in which strategic interests overlap, while local objectives remain important. This distinction explains why the relationship is valuable to Tehran.
Iran does not need to occupy Yemen, administer Aden or directly command every Houthi operation to benefit from the movement's ability to threaten Saudi interests and international maritime security. The strategic advantage comes from influence without the costs of direct occupation.
A movement operating independently within its own domestic environment can still produce outcomes that serve the broader interests of an external partner. It can stretch the defensive resources of rival states, create additional security pressures and complicate their regional calculations.
The current crisis illustrates this dynamic. As Iran confronts military pressure elsewhere in the region, the Houthis' ability to threaten Saudi Arabia and destabilise the Red Sea adds another dimension to the strategic difficulties facing Tehran's opponents. But this should not be interpreted as evidence that every Houthi action is directed by Iran. The movement's own calculations remain essential to understanding the conflict.
The more significant point is that Iran can benefit from the strategic position of an armed partner without possessing complete control over its decisions.
SAUDI ARABIA'S DILEMMA: MILITARY INTERVENTION WITHOUT A STABLE POLITICAL ORDER
Saudi Arabia's involvement in Yemen was driven by a major national security concern. The kingdom feared that the consolidation of Houthi power would create a hostile, Iran-aligned military presence on its southern border. It also feared that the movement's control of Sana'a would weaken the internationally recognised government and expand Iranian influence across the Arabian Peninsula.
The military intervention was intended to reverse that situation. More than a decade later, the Houthis remain firmly established in the north, while the government Saudi Arabia supports struggles to maintain a coherent political and military presence in the south. This outcome exposes the limitations of military intervention when the political structure being defended is itself deeply fragmented.
Saudi Arabia can provide weapons, financial assistance, military coordination and diplomatic support. It cannot easily manufacture political unity among groups with competing ambitions. The problem is not merely a shortage of military resources. It is the absence of a sufficiently unified political project.
Some government-aligned factions support the restoration of a unified Yemeni state. Others seek greater regional autonomy. Some southern groups want independence. Their common opposition to the Houthis does not mean they agree on who should govern Yemen after the war.
This creates a difficult strategic contradiction for Riyadh. Saudi Arabia needs a sufficiently cohesive partner capable of defending its interests and maintaining stability along its southern border. Yet the forces available to it are divided over the political future of the country they are supposed to defend.
The latest withdrawal illustrates the consequences of that weakness. A military coalition cannot sustain a long-term campaign simply through external support. It needs internal coordination, reliable command arrangements and agreement over the political objectives of the war.
Without those foundations, new offensives can produce temporary gains without creating durable security. Saudi Arabia's challenge is therefore larger than replacing military commanders or reinforcing front lines. It must help create a political arrangement that gives the forces it supports a reason to operate as part of a coherent national structure.
THE UAE AND THE UNRESOLVED SOUTHERN QUESTION
The United Arab Emirates adds another layer to Yemen's political complexity. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have cooperated in opposing Houthi expansion, but their priorities in Yemen have not always been identical. Abu Dhabi has cultivated relationships with southern forces and local actors whose political objectives sometimes differ from those of the internationally recognised government.
This is particularly important because the southern question predates the current war. North Yemen and South Yemen existed as separate states before unification in 1990. The union did not eliminate the political, economic and regional grievances that had shaped their separate histories. Southern discontent subsequently became a major feature of Yemen's political crisis.
For some southern groups, the current conflict is not simply about restoring the internationally recognised government. It is also an opportunity to secure greater autonomy or revive the possibility of an independent southern state. The Southern Transitional Council has been an important expression of this political ambition.
This creates a fundamental contradiction within the anti-Houthi coalition. Forces may cooperate against a common military adversary while disagreeing over the political future of the territory they are defending.
Saudi Arabia's priority has been to prevent Houthi dominance and protect its border security. The UAE has placed considerable emphasis on southern partners, coastal security and strategically important locations. Their interests overlap in important areas, but that does not mean their preferred political arrangements are identical.
The Houthis can benefit from this fragmentation. They do not have to persuade their opponents to abandon their opposition to Houthi rule. They only need the divisions among those opponents to remain sufficiently serious to undermine coordinated resistance.
This is one of the most important lessons of the conflict: a military coalition cannot remain effective indefinitely without a shared understanding of the political order it is fighting to preserve.
BAB EL-MANDEB: WHEN A LOCAL WAR THREATENS GLOBAL COMMERCE
The importance of Bab el-Mandeb extends far beyond Yemen. The strait connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and provides access to the Suez Canal, making it one of the world's most important maritime corridors. It is a major route for trade between Asia and Europe and an important passage for energy shipments.
Its significance is amplified by its relationship with the Strait of Hormuz. The two waterways occupy different positions in the global trading and energy system, but disruption around both can create serious pressure on shipping networks and international markets.
The simultaneous instability surrounding these maritime routes creates a serious challenge for international commerce. The danger is not limited to a complete closure of Bab el-Mandeb. The latest developments do not establish that the Houthis have achieved uncontested control of the strait or stopped all commercial traffic. The more immediate concern is the movement's ability to threaten vessels and make commercial operators question whether the route is safe enough to use.
In international shipping, uncertainty itself has an economic cost. A commercial vessel does not have to be destroyed for an attack to affect the wider economy. The threat of attack can lead to higher insurance premiums, additional security requirements and changes in shipping routes.
When vessels avoid the Red Sea and travel around the Cape of Good Hope, journeys between Asia and Europe become longer. Longer journeys require additional fuel, delay deliveries and increase operating expenses. Those costs can eventually affect manufacturers, importers, retailers and consumers.
The Houthi attacks on international shipping since late 2023 demonstrated how a relatively small armed movement can disrupt a major commercial corridor without possessing a conventional navy capable of controlling the sea. The latest territorial advances raise the possibility of renewed pressure on the same maritime environment.
The strategic calculation is straightforward: the Houthis do not need to control every vessel passing through Bab el-Mandeb to influence global shipping. They need to maintain a credible capacity to threaten it. That ability gives them leverage far beyond Yemen's economic and military weight.
WHY AFRICA SHOULD BE WATCHING
For African countries, the security of Bab el-Mandeb is not a distant Middle Eastern concern. The strait lies between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, close to the maritime approaches of Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia. The security of this corridor directly affects the wider commercial and strategic environment in which these countries operate.
Djibouti is particularly important because of its geographical position and its role as a major logistics and military hub. Any sustained deterioration in Red Sea security can affect the environment surrounding its ports, maritime infrastructure and regional commercial relationships.
The implications also extend to African economies farther from the Horn. Nigeria, for example, is not directly dependent on Bab el-Mandeb for all its international trade. Nevertheless, it is connected to the wider global shipping system. Disruption to major maritime corridors can influence freight costs, insurance charges, delivery schedules and the prices of imported goods.
The impact should not be exaggerated. A rise in maritime insecurity does not automatically translate into a specific increase in Nigerian inflation. Exchange rates, domestic transport costs, energy prices, taxation and other economic conditions also determine the final prices paid by consumers.
But the broader lesson is important: African economies remain exposed to geopolitical developments over which they exercise limited influence. Countries that depend heavily on imported machinery, pharmaceuticals, industrial inputs and consumer goods can be particularly vulnerable when international transport becomes more expensive or unpredictable.
Africa's strategic challenge is therefore not simply to monitor conflicts around important shipping routes. It is to strengthen economic resilience, diversify supply chains and develop greater capacity to participate in decisions affecting the security of international commerce.
The Red Sea crisis reinforces a reality that African policymakers often underestimate: geopolitical instability outside the continent can have direct consequences for African economic security.
THE HUMANITARIAN COST OF A FRAGMENTED STATE
Behind the military calculations and geopolitical competition is a deepening humanitarian emergency. The International Organization for Migration's Displacement Tracking Matrix reported that approximately 347,321 people had been displaced between August 1 and November 14, 2026, as a result of the escalation in western Yemen. The figure brings cumulative displacement recorded since the escalation began in June to approximately 348,377 people.
Taiz Governorate accounted for 143,130 displaced people, followed by Lahj with 91,314 and Aden with 70,404. <Cite refs={["turn660801search0"]}/>
These figures demonstrate the scale of the civilian disruption. Families are being forced from their homes, communities are losing access to essential services and receiving areas are struggling to accommodate additional populations. Taiz is particularly vulnerable. Its geographical position has made it a recurring centre of military confrontation, and the latest fighting has intensified restrictions on movement.
Reuters reported that the city remained besieged, with humanitarian supplies unable to enter and civilians unable to leave. <Cite refs={["turn660801news15"]}/>
Displacement is not merely a statistical measure. It represents the destruction of livelihoods, interrupted education, separation of families and increased dependence on humanitarian assistance. Aden and other areas receiving displaced people also face pressure on their limited infrastructure and public services. A city already experiencing economic and administrative difficulties cannot easily absorb a large increase in population.
The humanitarian crisis also has long-term political consequences. Prolonged displacement can deepen local grievances, weaken confidence in governing authorities and make post-war reconstruction more difficult. A country cannot rebuild a functioning political order while large sections of its population remain trapped in insecurity and displacement.
The humanitarian dimension is therefore not separate from the strategic crisis. It is one of its most damaging consequences and a reminder that territorial gains and military calculations are being achieved at an enormous civilian cost.
THREE POSSIBLE FUTURES FOR YEMEN
The current situation presents three broad possibilities.
The first is further Houthi consolidation. If the movement maintains its recent gains, strengthens its positions along the western coastline and continues to pressure the approaches to Aden, it could further weaken the internationally recognised government. Its advantage would not necessarily come from capturing every major city. It could come from controlling enough territory and threatening enough supply routes to make government authority increasingly difficult to sustain.
The second is the reorganisation of the anti-Houthi coalition. Saudi Arabia and its partners could attempt to rebuild military coordination, strengthen defensive positions and negotiate a clearer political understanding among the factions operating in the south. But this would require more than new commanders and additional military equipment. It would demand agreement over political authority, local autonomy and the future structure of the Yemeni state. Without such an agreement, a reorganised coalition could reproduce the same weaknesses that undermined earlier military campaigns.
The third is another prolonged stalemate. The Houthis might be unable to capture Aden, while government forces remain too divided to reverse the Houthi advances. Such an outcome would preserve the country's fragmentation, prolong the humanitarian crisis and maintain the threat to maritime security.
None of these scenarios is inevitable. The eventual balance will depend on military developments, the cohesion of the opposing forces, the calculations of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Iran's regional position and the possibility of renewed diplomatic engagement. But the central danger is already clear: Yemen's political fragmentation is providing the Houthis with opportunities to convert local military successes into wider strategic influence.
THE REAL POWER OF THE HOUTHIS IS WHAT THEIR OPPONENTS CANNOT COORDINATE
Yemen's latest military reversals reveal a paradox at the heart of the conflict. The Houthis are not confronting a unified national army. They are fighting a collection of forces whose opposition to Houthi rule has not produced a common political vision. That fragmentation has become one of the movement's greatest strategic advantages.
The Houthis have combined territorial control, military capabilities and geographical position to become a regional security actor. Their influence is no longer measured only by their control of Sana'a or the territory they administer. It is also measured by their ability to threaten Saudi interests, complicate international shipping and influence the security calculations of governments far beyond Yemen.
Iran benefits from this expanded leverage, although the Houthis retain their own leadership and political objectives. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is confronting the limits of a strategy that has struggled to turn military intervention into a stable political settlement. The UAE's relationships with southern actors add another dimension to the fragmentation, while international powers face the challenge of protecting maritime security without treating military pressure as a substitute for resolving Yemen's political crisis.
The most important question is therefore not simply whether the Houthis can advance further towards Aden. It is whether their opponents can overcome their divisions before the movement turns its battlefield gains into a durable political and strategic advantage.
Yemen's war demonstrates that a fragmented state can become more than a domestic security problem. It can become a platform through which regional powers exert influence, armed movements challenge stronger states and vulnerable international trade routes become instruments of geopolitical pressure.
The battle for Aden may determine the immediate future of the internationally recognised government. The struggle around Bab el-Mandeb could influence the security of one of the world's most important commercial corridors. But the deeper crisis lies in the political vacuum connecting both fronts.
Saudi Arabia entered Yemen to prevent a hostile movement from reshaping the security environment along its southern border. More than a decade later, the movement remains entrenched, its military reach has expanded and the political coalition assembled against it is struggling to defend its own territory. That is the strategic failure the latest withdrawal exposes.
The Houthis are not gaining influence simply because they are advancing. They are gaining influence because their opponents have yet to build a political and military order capable of containing them. And as long as Yemen's fragmentation continues to serve their strategic interests, the consequences will reach far beyond Yemen's borders.