By Ephraim Agbo
For millions of Afghans, returning to Afghanistan is no longer a simple story of going home. At the Torkham crossing on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, families arrive carrying the remnants of lives they spent years building elsewhere. Some bring suitcases and bundles of clothing; others carry cooking utensils, livestock and whatever possessions they were able to save before leaving. Children walk beside exhausted parents, many of whom have no clear idea of where they will live, how they will earn an income or how their children will continue their education.
The scenes are being repeated across Afghanistan’s borders with Pakistan and Iran. Since 2023, almost six million Afghans have returned from neighbouring countries, including large numbers who have been deported or pressured to leave. The scale of the movement is extraordinary, but the statistic can conceal the human reality. Six million people are not simply crossing international borders; they are losing jobs, homes, schools, communities and, in some cases, the only country they have ever known.
This is the central contradiction of Afghanistan’s return crisis: millions of Afghans are being told to go home while the country to which they are returning has limited capacity to receive and reintegrate them. Afghanistan is already struggling with poverty, unemployment, humanitarian needs, weak public services and restrictions that have sharply affected the participation of women and girls in education and economic life. The arrival of millions more people inevitably places additional pressure on an already fragile system.
The crisis should therefore not be understood merely as an immigration dispute between Afghanistan and its neighbours. It is simultaneously a humanitarian, economic, social and protection crisis. The most important question is no longer simply how many Afghans are being returned, but whether those who return can establish secure and sustainable lives after they cross the border.
When “Home” Is No Longer Home
The language of “return” creates an assumption of familiarity that does not always exist. Many Afghans coming from Pakistan and Iran have spent decades outside Afghanistan. Some were born abroad, while others left as children and grew up entirely in their host countries. Their Afghan identity may be unquestionable, but their lived experience may have little connection with contemporary Afghanistan.
For a young Afghan born and raised in Pakistan, for example, Pakistan may be the country whose schools, streets, language and social networks are familiar. A woman who has spent most of her adult life in Iran may have strong family and cultural ties to Afghanistan but no established livelihood waiting for her there. In such circumstances, returning to the country of one's ancestry can feel less like coming home than entering an unfamiliar society.
That distinction matters because reintegration depends on more than nationality. People rebuild their lives through family networks, employment relationships, community connections, access to services and familiarity with their surroundings. Someone who loses legal residency, employment and social networks at the same time is far more vulnerable than someone returning voluntarily to an established home.
The experience of one returning woman illustrates the problem. Her husband had already been deported, and she said she had to borrow money from several people to make the journey herself. She had never been to Afghanistan before. For her, the journey was therefore not a straightforward return to a familiar homeland. It was a forced transition into an environment she had never experienced as a resident.
The Border Is Only the Beginning
Governments can count deportations, process documents and register people at border crossings. Those are measurable administrative tasks. Reintegration is much harder to measure because it begins only after the official process has ended.
Once a family crosses into Afghanistan, practical questions immediately arise. Where will it live? Where will the adults find employment? Will the children be able to attend school? Can the family afford food and healthcare? What happens to people who have no relatives, property or community waiting for them? And what happens to those who have legitimate fears about their personal security?
These questions reveal the weakness of treating mass returns primarily as an immigration-management exercise. Returning a person is an administrative act; rebuilding that person's life is a long-term social and economic process. A border crossing can process thousands of people, but it cannot create the conditions required for them to become economically independent.
This distinction is particularly important in Afghanistan, where the return of millions of people is occurring against a backdrop of widespread humanitarian need and limited economic opportunity. The country's ability to absorb returnees cannot simply be assumed because they are Afghan citizens.
Afghanistan’s Absorption Problem
Afghanistan already faces severe economic and humanitarian pressures. Employment opportunities are limited, public services remain weak and millions of people depend on some form of humanitarian assistance. At the same time, international funding for humanitarian operations has come under increasing pressure.
The arrival of millions of returnees creates an additional strain on almost every major area of public life. More people require housing, food, healthcare, education, water and employment. If the economy does not expand quickly enough to accommodate them, the return process can deepen existing poverty rather than reduce it.
In a strong and expanding economy, population growth can create additional demand, increase production and generate new businesses and jobs. In a fragile economy, however, a sudden increase in population can intensify competition for scarce employment and resources. A returnee who cannot find work may become dependent on relatives or humanitarian assistance, while a family unable to afford housing may end up in an informal settlement.
The danger is that a cycle of displacement becomes a cycle of poverty: people leave because they cannot survive, return because they are no longer permitted to remain elsewhere, and then struggle to survive after returning. Without meaningful economic reintegration, the underlying pressures that produce migration remain intact.
Humanitarian Aid Cannot Replace an Economy
International humanitarian agencies can help families survive the immediate shock of return. They can provide food, temporary shelter, cash assistance, healthcare and other forms of emergency support. Such assistance can be indispensable, particularly during the first days and weeks after arrival.
But humanitarian assistance is not a substitute for economic development. Food aid can prevent hunger, but it cannot create employment. Temporary shelter can provide immediate protection, but it cannot solve long-term housing needs. Emergency medical support can save lives, but it cannot replace a functioning national healthcare system.
This creates one of the most serious contradictions in Afghanistan's current situation. The number of people requiring assistance is increasing while the resources available to humanitarian organisations are under pressure. If this gap continues to widen, Afghanistan could be left attempting to integrate millions of returnees with a humanitarian system designed primarily to respond to emergencies rather than provide long-term economic solutions.
The international community therefore faces a choice between continually financing emergency relief and helping create the economic conditions that allow returnees to become self-sufficient. The second approach is considerably more difficult, but without it, humanitarian dependence risks becoming permanent.
Pakistan’s Position Cannot Be Ignored
Pakistan's role in the crisis must also be considered in its full complexity. For more than four decades, Pakistan has hosted enormous Afghan populations fleeing successive wars and political upheavals. Millions of Afghans crossed the border during the Soviet occupation and subsequent conflicts, and generations have since been born and raised in Pakistan.
Islamabad therefore argues that it cannot be expected to host undocumented migrants indefinitely. The Pakistani government has also cited concerns about national security, border management and the presence of people without valid legal documentation. Those concerns cannot simply be dismissed. A sovereign state has the right to control its borders and determine who has the legal right to remain within its territory.
But the existence of that right does not eliminate humanitarian responsibilities. The important question is not whether Pakistan can enforce immigration law; it is whether those laws are being implemented in a manner that protects vulnerable people and respects international principles governing returns.
There is a fundamental difference between an orderly return in which people are informed, protected and able to prepare for departure, and a process in which families fear arrest, lose their livelihoods and have little meaningful control over when or how they leave. The distinction between legal immigration enforcement and forced displacement therefore deserves much greater attention.
Iran Faces a Similar Dilemma
Iran's position contains many of the same tensions. The country has hosted large Afghan populations for decades, and Afghan workers have become an important part of sections of Iran's labour force. Tehran, however, has increasingly sought to remove undocumented Afghans, arguing that it cannot indefinitely accommodate people without legal status.
Iran has its own economic, political and security pressures, and its government has a legitimate interest in regulating migration. Yet the humanitarian consequences of mass returns remain significant. For an Afghan worker who has spent years in Iran, deportation can mean the sudden loss of employment and income. For a child, it may mean leaving a familiar school. For an entire family, it may mean returning to a country where they have no home.
This is why the debate cannot be reduced to whether governments have the legal authority to remove undocumented migrants. The manner, conditions and consequences of return matter just as much as the legal status of the person being returned.
Girls Are Returning to a Narrower Future
The education of children, particularly girls, adds another layer to the crisis. Afghan families returning from Pakistan and Iran may find that educational opportunities available to their daughters abroad are significantly more restricted after their return to Afghanistan.
This is not merely an education issue. It is also a question of Afghanistan's future economic capacity. A country attempting to rebuild after decades of conflict needs doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers, entrepreneurs, researchers and other skilled professionals. Preventing girls from acquiring education reduces the pool of human capital available to the country in the future.
The consequences may not be immediately visible, but they are potentially enormous. A girl prevented from completing her education today may represent a doctor, teacher, engineer or businesswoman who will never enter the workforce tomorrow. Afghanistan therefore faces a contradiction between its need for reconstruction and policies that restrict the development of a substantial part of its population.
For families returning with daughters, this makes the journey particularly painful. They may be returning to a country that is their ancestral homeland while simultaneously confronting the possibility that their children's futures will be narrower than they were in the countries they have left.
Not Everyone Is Returning to Safety
Economic hardship is not the only concern. For some Afghans, the principal fear is security.
People who worked for Afghanistan's former government, military or security institutions may have particular reasons to fear returning under Taliban rule. The Taliban have announced amnesty measures intended to reassure former officials and others associated with the previous political order, but official assurances do not automatically eliminate personal fears.
One former government supporter described living largely inside his home because he feared for his safety. His experience illustrates why the concept of “safe return” cannot be determined solely by broad political declarations.
A country may be considered generally stable while particular individuals face specific risks because of their past employment, political associations or other circumstances. The relevant question is therefore not simply whether Afghanistan is safe in general, but whether it is safe for the particular person being returned.
That is an important distinction whenever governments make large-scale deportation decisions.
Deportation Does Not Necessarily End Displacement
The most important analytical point is perhaps the simplest: a person can be returned to their country of origin and still remain displaced.
Consider the trajectory of a family that fled Afghanistan years ago, built a life in Pakistan or Iran, lost its legal status and was subsequently deported. If that family arrives in Afghanistan without a home, employment, social network or adequate access to services, the physical journey has ended but the underlying displacement has not.
The family may become internally displaced, dependent on humanitarian aid or eventually seek another route out of the country. The location has changed, but the fundamental insecurity remains.
This is why physical return should not be confused with durable reintegration. A successful return is not achieved when a person crosses a border. It is achieved when that person can live safely, earn a livelihood, access essential services and participate in society without being forced to flee again.
The International Community Risks Mistaking Movement for a Solution
There is a danger that the international community will measure the success of the Afghan return process by the number of people who have crossed the border rather than by what happens to them afterward.
That would be a serious mistake.
The closure of a refugee case does not necessarily mean the end of a humanitarian crisis. If millions of people return to unemployment, inadequate housing, food insecurity, restricted education and insecurity, the crisis has not disappeared. It has simply changed location.
The consequences could eventually extend beyond Afghanistan. People who cannot establish sustainable lives after returning may attempt to migrate again. Increased poverty can create social instability, while pressure on communities can deepen humanitarian needs. In that sense, failing to support reintegration today could contribute to another migration crisis tomorrow.
Who Pays for the Return?
The question of responsibility is therefore unavoidable. Pakistan argues that it cannot carry the Afghan refugee burden indefinitely. Iran makes a similar argument. Afghanistan lacks the resources to absorb millions of additional people without substantial assistance. Humanitarian organisations face funding constraints, while donor governments are dealing with competing crises around the world.
Each position contains elements of legitimacy.
But when every actor explains why the responsibility cannot belong entirely to them, the burden ultimately falls on those with the least power: the returnees themselves.
It falls on the father who has lost his income, the mother who borrowed money to make the journey, the child who may lose access to education and the former official who fears leaving his home.
This is the political economy of forced return: the costs of a policy made by governments are often absorbed by people who had little influence over the decision.
What a Sustainable Response Would Require
A credible response to Afghanistan's return crisis cannot end at the border. Countries returning Afghans need to ensure that vulnerable people are adequately protected and that returns comply with relevant humanitarian and international obligations.
Afghanistan, meanwhile, requires much more than emergency relief. Reintegration will require investment in housing, employment, education, healthcare, infrastructure and local communities receiving large numbers of returnees. Without economic opportunity, even generous humanitarian programmes will struggle to produce lasting results.
International assistance must therefore move beyond simply keeping people alive. It must help create the conditions under which people can become economically independent and rebuild their lives.
Education must also remain central, particularly for girls. Afghanistan cannot realistically rebuild its economy while excluding a large proportion of its population from education and professional development.
Most importantly, reintegration must be understood as a process rather than an event. A returnee crossing a border is not the end of a humanitarian story. It is the beginning of a difficult process of rebuilding.
The Crisis Behind the Number
Nearly six million returns are difficult to comprehend as a single statistic. But the number becomes more meaningful when viewed through individual lives: a family losing its home, a father losing his income, a child leaving school, a young woman facing a restricted future or a former government employee living with fear.
These are the human realities hidden inside the statistics.
Afghanistan has endured decades of war, displacement and political upheaval. The latest return wave risks adding another layer to that history unless the country receives the resources and international support necessary to absorb those arriving.
The international community should therefore resist the temptation to declare the Afghan displacement crisis solved simply because millions of Afghans are once again inside Afghanistan. Returning people is not the same as rebuilding their lives.
At Torkham, the gates open and families walk through. Officials can register their arrival, record their numbers and move them onward. But the real test begins after the paperwork is complete.
Can they find a home? Can they find work? Can their children attend school? Can women participate in society? Can vulnerable people live without fear? Until those questions have credible answers, Afghanistan's return crisis remains unresolved. A border can determine where a person ends up. It cannot, by itself, give that person a home.