Low Expectations in Anchorage — but Could There Be a Nuclear Silver Lining at the Trump–Putin Summit?

By Ephraim Agbo 

The first one-on-one meeting between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in six years opened in Anchorage, Alaska, under an atmosphere of disbelief and cautious understatement. Many framed the summit as a “listening exercise” with most observers publicly lowering expectations for immediate breakthroughs on Ukraine. Yet beneath the predictable focus on the battlefield, a quieter thread of strategic diplomacy—nuclear and arms-control talk—could emerge as a modest but important silver lining if both leaders choose to treat it seriously.

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low expectations, heavy emphasis on Ukraine

So many ongoing reports of the summit emphasized how muted the rhetoric around the meeting was. Journalists on site described officials as “downplaying expectations” and characterized much of the visit as a fact-finding, atmosphere-setting engagement rather than a negotiation aimed at producing immediate, enforceable deals. Yet, despite the low expectations, could there be a nuclear silver lining—a limited optimism about political outcomes but the possibility of strategic dialogue?

That scepticism was visible everywhere: Ukrainian leaders were left out of the talks and warned the summit would be hollow if it produced decisions about Ukraine without Kyiv’s involvement. Domestic protesters in Anchorage and cautious statements from US officials reinforced the idea that the event’s primary purpose — at least publicly — was to “listen” and to set the table for possible follow-up talks, not to sign off on a rapid diplomatic settlement.

This matters because two pillars of Cold War–era stability — the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the New START Treaty — have either collapsed or are on the verge of expiry.

INF Treaty: Signed in 1987 by the US and USSR, eliminated an entire class of weapons — banning ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 km and 5,500 km. By 1991, over 2,692 missiles had been destroyed under its terms. The US withdrew in 2019, citing Russian violations, and since then both nations have resumed development of intermediate-range systems.

New START Treaty: Signed in 2010 and entering force in 2011, caps each side at 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, 700 deployed launchers (missiles and bombers), and 800 total launchers (deployed + non-deployed). It was extended once to January 2026, but without a successor agreement in negotiation, these limits — and their robust verification regime — will disappear when it expires.

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Why observers still see strategic openings — beyond the headlines

Most reporting about the summit placed Ukraine at the centre, but several credible outlets have pointed out signals that the agenda could include broader “strategic security” issues. Kremlin delegates and press signals—plus the presence of senior Russian officials—suggested that topics like sanctions, security guarantees and possibly arms control could be discussed in or around the talks. If so, that opens the door to narrower, technical deals (or at least an exploratory resumption of dialogue) on nuclear risk reduction and arms-control confidence building.

In short: even if the meeting produces no sweeping political settlement on Ukraine, the summit could yield incremental steps on nuclear posture, transparency, or talks to re-open previously dormant negotiation tracks. Those steps have real value — they reduce the risk of miscalculation and build procedures that matter more when crises flare.

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What a “nuclear silver lining” might realistically look like

If policymakers wanted to convert rhetorical openings into concrete outcomes, likely near-term deliverables could include:

• A commitment to resume formal or informal arms-control talks (discussions, working groups, or a schedule for negotiations). Even a joint statement to reopen channels would be significant after years of treaty erosion.
• Risk-reduction measures or transparency steps, such as notification protocols for major exercises, or shared hotlines for military incidents. These are low-cost, high-value confidence builders.
• A narrower, technical agreement on inspection or verification workstreams as a first step toward reviving broader treaties. That would not be a treaty renewal, but it would re-establish professional contact between arms-control experts.

Each of these would be modest in isolation but meaningful in aggregate: they reduce the likelihood of accidental escalation, limit strategic ambiguity, and preserve the diplomatic architecture that makes larger agreements possible later. Importantly, because they are technical rather than political, they can sometimes be advanced even when high-level political trust is low.

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Obstacles and why a silver lining is far from guaranteed

There are substantial and obvious barriers:

• Mistrust and public politics. Any perception that the US is negotiating away Ukrainian interests would be politically explosive in Washington and among allies; that constrains what the White House can credibly offer.
• Russia’s bargaining posture. Moscow’s demands on Ukraine and its strategic posture make it unlikely to accept far-reaching concessions simply to restart arms-control talks—unless it sees offsetting political gains.
• Treaty attrition. Years of treaty withdrawals and competitive weapon developments mean the baseline is degraded, so reconstructing verification and compliance mechanisms will be technically harder and politically sensitive.

Those obstacles mean a summit that produces only a photo op will also be wholly possible. But they don’t eliminate the chance of narrow, practical gains.

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What to watch next (and how to interpret small wins)

To know whether the meeting produces a genuine strategic turn, watch for:

1. Language in joint statements — phrases committing to “resume discussions,” to “risk-reduction,” or to “transparency” are small but consequential markers.
2. Follow-up contacts at the expert level — appointments for working groups, exchanges between defence/foreign ministry officials, or scheduling of technical talks. Those are the concrete steps that turn rhetoric into planning.
3. Allied reactions — how European capitals and Kyiv respond will shape what the US can credibly do next; strong allied cooperation can enable firmer American commitments.

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Bottom line: modest hope, guarded realism

Low expectations, but with the possibility of a “nuclear silver lining,” may be the most accurate shorthand for what’s on the table. Don’t expect an immediate peace treaty or a sweeping arms-control revival. But do take seriously the prospect that quiet, technical, confidence-building measures could be the summit’s most valuable legacy. These measures matter: they may not make headlines like ceasefires, but they chip away at the structural risks that make crises dangerous. If this meeting produces even a credible plan to restore technical channels on nuclear risk and verification, that will be an outcome worth noting—precisely because it won’t look dramatic at first glance.