August 16, 2025

Gold, Guns and Gulf Flightpaths — how Sudan’s soil is fueling a war economy

By Ephraim Agbo

When South Sudan took most of the oil in 2011, Khartoum lost its fiscal backbone. What filled the gap was not reform or investment but a rush for a different buried treasure: gold. That shift has done more than reshape livelihoods in Sudan’s mining belts — it has become central to how the country is being fought over, financed and fragmented today.

This post pulls together recent reporting and research to explain, in one narrative, how artisanal miners, smuggling networks, shadowy military actors and Gulf markets combined to turn gold into the fuel of Sudan’s civil war.


Scale and who actually digs the gold

Sudan’s gold sector is overwhelmingly artisanal and small-scale. Recent research finds that roughly 80–85% of declared gold production comes from artisanal miners — an army of over a million people working manually across open-air sites in a dozen states. These are not large industrial mines with corporate pay-sheets; they are tents, hand-dug pits, sluices and panning operations where families and migrants eke out incomes.

Because traditional artisanal methods are inefficient, miners use mercury and cyanide to separate gold from ore — a cheap, fast, and toxic method that leaves long-term health and environmental damage in its wake. Reporting from environmental and health outlets has documented boiling mercury, child labour in camps, and contaminated waterways in mining areas.


The economics: from oil shock to a gold “lifeline”

The secession of South Sudan in 2011 removed more than 70% of the country’s oil reserves and plunged Sudan into fiscal crisis. Gold production and exports were ramped up to plug the gap — and that made gold structurally important to the state and to competing power centres inside Sudan. The competition over gold assets and revenues was already a political and economic pressure-point before open hostilities erupted in April 2023.

By 2024–25, amid ongoing conflict and rising global prices, Sudan’s gold output rebounded sharply: reporting places annual production in the 60–80 tonne range (with declared production figures somewhat lower due to smuggling). The value of that output runs into the billions — a lifeline for anyone who controls supply chains.


How gold funds war: actors, structures, and the off-books economy

Gold has become a cash machine for both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Both sides control, tax or directly exploit mining areas and processing hubs. The RSF — which grew out of militia groups and was formalised as a powerful paramilitary actor — gained early footholds in gold trade infrastructure, using front companies and partnerships to move metal into international markets. The army, provincial governors and security services have done the same in other regions. When gold is exported without declaration, it bypasses the Central Bank and normal fiscal channels, creating ready cash for wages, weapons and sustainment of operations.

Smuggling happens on multiple scales. Individual miners and local traders carry small parcels across porous borders. Larger networks — reportedly linked to military units, shady trading firms, and transnational brokers — consolidate and ship significant loads out through regional hubs. The end destinations are often Dubai and other Gulf trading centres where lax oversight (and demand for physical gold) make it easier to convert metal into hard currency or jewellery.


The UAE connection: market, opacity and geopolitics

A large share of Sudanese gold ends up in the United Arab Emirates. Investigations and reporting show both officially declared shipments and large volumes that appear to be re-exported or recorded with opaque paperwork — practices that enable metals to be absorbed into global supply chains with little traceability. Because the UAE is a major global gold hub, Sudanese metal can be melted, recast or traded in ways that sever provenance. That market access has been decisive: it is one of the main reasons gold can be monetised quickly and at scale for war finance.

International responses — sanctions on specific firms and tighter export scrutiny — have been attempted, but blocking an opaque commodity chain that runs through multiple countries and informal networks is notoriously difficult. Geopolitical interests in the region further complicate enforcement.


Human and environmental costs

The gold economy’s apparent “success” at generating cash masks deep suffering. Mining camps attract displaced people and migrants desperate for income, but the work is dangerous: collapses, violent clashes over sites, exposure to chemicals, and exploitative labour practices are common. Environmental devastation — contaminated water, poisoned soils and ruined farmland — will impair recovery long after the guns fall silent. Recent reporting documents mine collapses and rising mortality and injuries in the mining belts.


Why this matters beyond Sudan

Sudan’s gold story is not merely a national tragedy; it is a cautionary case of how natural-resource shocks, weak governance and regional market linkages can reconfigure a conflict. When a commodity is simultaneously a lifeline for local livelihoods, a bank for armed groups, and a tradable commodity in international markets, it becomes extremely hard to disentangle humanitarian relief, economic development and conflict resolution.


What could help — and what probably won’t

Short-term: tighter international due diligence in major gold hubs (better reporting, origin verification, and restrictions on suspicious shipments) would reduce off-book channels, make it harder for combatants to monetise metal and raise the bar for buyers. Targeted sanctions on firms and brokers with strong evidence of complicit behaviour can increase the cost of illicit trade.

Long-term: livelihood alternatives for mining communities, stronger local governance of mineral rights, and environmental remediation are essential — but impossible to scale while insecurity persists. Any credible reform requires political progress inside Sudan and coordinated pressure from regional partners and market states.



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