Madagascar at a Crossroads: how service protests, a fracturing military, and generational anger produced a coup risk

By Ephraim Agbo 

On 12 October 2025, Madagascar’s months-long protests over water and electricity shortages intersected with a dramatic shift inside the security forces: members of the elite CAPSAT unit mobilized in Antananarivo, refused orders to fire on demonstrators, escorted youth into the symbolic May 13 Square, and signalled they now controlled parts of the military. The presidency publicly warned an “illegal and forcible seizure of power” was under way. Those are the proximate facts; the deeper story is about institutional weakness, a delegitimized political class, and a military whose political role has been normalized for decades.

Structural drivers: service failure as political detonator

Long before soldiers marched into the capital, ordinary grievances had metastasised into political rage. Recurrent power cuts and water shortages in urban centres are immediate, visible failures of governance — problems that disproportionately affect young people, entrepreneurs, and the urban poor. In contexts where state legitimacy is already fragile, repeated daily humiliations (no electricity to run a small business, no water for a household) become shorthand for corruption, clientelism, and elite neglect. Madagascar’s protests began as a utilities movement in late September but tapped a far broader, pent-up frustration with an unresponsive political class. Contemporary reporting places the start of the demonstrations around 25 September and traces their rapid expansion to nationwide anti-government demands.

Generational politics and movement form: why “Gen Z” matters

Social movements in 2025 look different: decentralized leadership, heavy use of social media, and culturally resonant symbols (songs, flash-mobs, specific squares). Young activists in Madagascar have used these tools to bypass traditional parties and unions, making the protests less negotiable through old patronage channels. The protesters’ demands — improvement in services, accountability, and even the dissolution of certain institutions — reflect an intergenerational contract-breaking: a generation that expected incremental improvement now demands systemic reset.

Military politics: CAPSAT is not a neutral actor

CAPSAT (Camp Capsat), the elite unit now at the centre of events, is not a neutral security formation. It was instrumental in the 2009 mutiny that precipitated the removal of President Marc Ravalomanana and brought Andry Rajoelina into national prominence. That institutional memory matters: an elite unit with a history of kingmaking carries political agency. When parts of the armed forces refuse to fire on demonstrators and publicly assert control over military command, they shift the political balance — whether their goal is protection of civilians, pressure for reform, or a change of regime. Reporting today confirms CAPSAT’s central role in recent events and recalls its 2009 legacy.

Regime resilience and constraints on Rajoelina

Rajoelina’s political survival depends on multiple pillars: the loyalty of security services, elite coalitions (business and regional power brokers), and international actors. The weakening or fracturing of any pillar raises the odds of rapid change. Two dynamics now constrain the presidency: first, visible defections or neutrality among parts of the security apparatus reduce coercive capacity; second, visible popular mobilization in symbolic urban spaces (May 13 Square) undermines claims of normal governance. Even if Rajoelina remains physically in Madagascar (his office has insisted he is), his bargaining position is weakened by both an emboldened street and a divided military.

Immediate humanitarian and economic effects — beyond headline politics

Violence has human costs (reported casualties and injuries), and unrest has tangible economic spillovers: airlines suspended flights, curfews disrupt markets, and the tourism and export sectors face immediate interruptions. Travel advisories and flight suspensions are already being reported, amplifying short-term economic pain and increasing pressure on the government to restore order or secure external assurances. These economic channels are often what force rapid negotiation — or, in some cases, harden positions when elites fear loss of assets.

Three distinct scenarios (and their triggers)

1. Negotiated containment (moderate probability, but fragile): Military moderates broker a roadmap: limited cabinet reshuffle, promises of investigation, and a timetable for reforms. Trigger: clear and public agreement among key military commanders and some elite brokers to avoid a takeover; international actors offer incentives and monitoring. This preserves a veneer of civilian rule but leaves unresolved structural grievances.
2. Military interregnum (plausible): An interim military administration or junta governs for a limited period, promising technocratic reform before transferring power. Trigger: unified military command and refusal of political elites to cede reform space; lack of immediate international pressure. This risks repression and diplomatic isolation.
3. Escalation and prolonged instability (worst case): Hardline loyalist units attempt to retake control, sparking urban warfare and a breakdown of public order. Trigger: fragmentation within CAPSAT or between gendarmerie and army, and a decision by one faction to use force against the other. This would produce sustained humanitarian and economic crises.

These  probabilities depends on two near-term variables: (a) whether CAPSAT speaks with a single, authoritative voice, and (b) whether the broader officer corps follows CAPSAT or remains loyal to the presidency.

International responses: limited levers, reputational costs

Regional organizations (AU, SADC), former colonial partners, and multilateral lenders can raise costs for anti-democratic change through travel bans, sanctions, and withholding aid. But their capacity to shape immediate outcomes is limited: incentives/disincentives take time, and military actors often calculate they can absorb them in the short term. What international actors can meaningfully do is: coordinate clear red lines (e.g., no transfer of power by force), mobilize rapid mediation, and prepare contingency humanitarian and economic support to reduce shocks. Early reporting shows international concern and travel advisories.

What to track now

• Public claims of authority: Does CAPSAT publish a coherent chain-of-command statement? Who is the named army chief? (These are immediate indicators of an institutional takeover.)
• Security cohesion: Are other security services (presidential guard, gendarmerie, police) aligning with CAPSAT or the presidency? Fragmentation predicts escalation.
• Elite bargains: Are key economic actors (major business owners, provincial governors) publicly or privately signaling support for mediation or for a new order?
• International posture: Will regional bodies issue a joint statement, and will flights/aid begin to be suspended more broadly?

Final assessment — the political logic of the moment

The Malagasy crisis is not a textbook “coup” that emerges solely from military ambition; it is the product of popular delegitimation and a military whose political agency has been normalized. That hybridity — protest plus military intervention — complicates the normative and policy response: what looks like protection of civilians can rapidly become seizure of power. The most likely short-term outcome is negotiated de-escalation mediated by military elders and external actors — but that outcome will only be durable if it addresses the underlying service failures and the democratic deficit that birthed the protests. Otherwise, the cycle of crisis and elite replacement will repeat.