By Ephraim Agbo
When Pakistan’s Defence Minister declared “open war” on 27 February 2026, it was framed as a sudden rupture. It was not. The escalation between Islamabad and Kabul represents the culmination of long-standing structural tensions — historical, ideological, and strategic — that have repeatedly destabilised their relationship.
Reducing the confrontation to a border clash or a counter-terrorism dispute obscures the deeper reality: this is the breakdown of an already fragile security architecture in South Asia.
The Durand Line: A Border Without Consensus
The dispute begins with the Durand Line, drawn in 1893 by British India. For Pakistan, it is the internationally recognised western boundary and the legal foundation of its territorial sovereignty. For Afghanistan, it remains a colonial imposition that divided Pashtun communities and was never formally ratified by a sovereign Afghan state.
The disagreement is not symbolic; it shapes security policy. The 2,600-kilometre frontier cuts through mountainous terrain that has historically allowed militant groups, smugglers, and tribal networks to move across with relative ease. Attempts by Pakistan to fence the border — now largely completed — have been contested by Afghan authorities, who reject the legitimacy of the demarcation itself.
This unresolved question ensures that every security incident along the frontier carries political weight far beyond its tactical significance.
The Post-2021 Reversal: Strategic Blowback
For decades, Pakistan pursued what analysts often describe as “strategic depth” in Afghanistan — cultivating influence with Islamist factions to counter Indian presence. The Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in August 2021 was initially viewed in Islamabad as a strategic gain.
Instead, it has exposed a severe vulnerability.
Since 2021, attacks inside Pakistan attributed to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have surged dramatically. According to regional security monitors, militant violence in Pakistan increased by more than 60% in 2023 compared to the previous year, with hundreds of security personnel killed. Major attacks have targeted police stations, military convoys, and border posts, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
Islamabad accuses Kabul of allowing TTP fighters safe haven across the border. The Taliban government denies this, insisting it does not permit Afghan soil to be used against other states. Whether due to ideological sympathy, limited capacity, or internal factional constraints, the Taliban authorities have not neutralised the TTP threat to Pakistan’s satisfaction.
The February 2026 airstrikes signal a strategic admission: Pakistan no longer believes cross-border diplomacy alone can manage the threat.
From Proxy Conflict to Open Confrontation
The most consequential shift is not the violence itself — cross-border exchanges are not new — but its scale and visibility.
Direct airstrikes on Afghan territory, followed by retaliatory attacks on Pakistani military posts, mark a transition from shadow conflict to overt state confrontation. Deterrence appears to have weakened on both sides.
Pakistan’s leadership appears to be applying coercive pressure: raising the cost to Kabul of tolerating militant groups. Yet this strategy assumes the Taliban government responds to conventional deterrence logic — a proposition that remains uncertain. The Taliban’s internal power structure is decentralised, and authority between Kandahar-based leadership and other factions is not always cohesive.
Without reliable military hotlines or structured de-escalation mechanisms, each retaliatory step increases the risk of miscalculation.
The Regional Multiplier Effect
Pakistan has also raised concerns about Indian influence in Afghanistan. While hard evidence of direct involvement in the current escalation remains contested, the perception of encirclement shapes Pakistani strategic thinking. For Islamabad, instability along the western frontier combined with rivalry in the east compounds its security anxiety.
The conflict also affects regional economics. The Torkham and Chaman crossings facilitate an estimated over $1.5–2 billion in annual bilateral trade, in addition to transit routes connecting Afghanistan to Pakistani ports. Border closures disrupt fuel shipments, food supplies, and daily wage labour, with immediate economic consequences for border communities.
The humanitarian dimension is equally significant. Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees for decades. Recent repatriation drives and renewed fighting risk accelerating displacement flows at a time when Afghanistan already faces severe economic contraction and food insecurity affecting nearly half its population.
Domestic Pressures and Strategic Signaling
Escalation cannot be viewed solely through an external lens. Pakistan faces persistent economic strain, political polarisation, and pressure on its security institutions. A forceful response to militant violence serves not only as external signaling to Kabul but also as reassurance to domestic audiences that the state retains control.
For the Taliban government, standing firm against Pakistani strikes reinforces nationalist credentials and sovereignty narratives. Neither side can afford to appear weak — a dynamic that narrows space for compromise.
The Nuclear Shadow
While Afghanistan is not a nuclear power, Pakistan is. This reality places an upper ceiling on regional escalation. Any perception that the conflict could entangle India introduces strategic caution at higher levels of decision-making. Even if nuclear weapons are not directly relevant to the Afghan theatre, they shape broader regional deterrence calculations.
A Chronic Structural Conflict
The current escalation is not an isolated crisis. It is the acute manifestation of three unresolved structural problems:
- A border dispute rooted in colonial demarcation.
- Militant networks operating across porous terrain.
- Competing strategic visions for regional influence.
Absent a sustained diplomatic reset — one that addresses both TTP sanctuaries and the political sensitivity of the Durand Line — periodic escalation is likely to recur.
The frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan has never been merely geographic. It is political, ideological, and historical. Until those layers are addressed together rather than tactically, military force will remain a temporary instrument — not a solution.
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