Trump in Asia, Xi at the Table, and a New Phase of Strategic Competition: What the recent Asia trip, a rare-earths détente, and Beijing–Moscow ties tell us about the next chapter in geopolitics

By Ephraim Agbo 

President Trump’s whirlwind Asia tour — capped by a high-stakes meeting with President Xi Jinping — was not merely a succession of photo ops and red carpets. It was a deliberate attempt to recast U.S. strategy in an era of intensifying strategic rivalry, and it exposed three interlocking dynamics that will shape global politics in the months and years ahead: (1) the U.S. returning to high-touch diplomacy despite an “America First” brand, (2) China’s growing role as both a partner and enabler in geopolitical flashpoints, and (3) an increasingly fragile but consequential interdependence around critical resources — above all, rare earths and energy.

Diplomacy as legacy-building — and why it matters

The optics of the trip matter precisely because the U.S. president who campaigned on isolationist themes has spent measurable diplomatic capital across Asia in a short window. Whether he’s courting South Korean leaders, engaging Southeast Asian governments, or stepping into a one-on-one with Xi, the itinerary signals that the administration views foreign visits as instruments for rapid, high-impact outcomes — from trade adjustments to security assurances. That posture is both an operational shift and a political wager: it attempts to convert short-term headlines into a durable “peacemaker” legacy.

But presidential diplomacy has an unstable multiplier: decisions taken from the platform of spectacle can produce swift gains (arrangements, declarations, relief for supply chains) — and equally swift reversals (new tariffs, sudden policy shifts) when domestic politics or personal impulses intervene. In short: diplomatic drama can buy space, but not necessarily long-term reliability.

The rare-earths detente: a narrow but pivotal win

One concrete product of the diplomacy was a limited resumption of rare-earth exports to the United States under terms that buy Washington breathing room. Rare earths — the handful of minerals essential to semiconductors, batteries, electric motors, and many defense systems — have been a strategic chokepoint. Any Chinese decision to withhold or throttle those exports produces immediate strain on U.S. industry and military preparedness. The partial resumption therefore represents more than a trade concession: it temporarily reduces a critical lever of coercion and gives the U.S. time to diversify supply chains and increase domestic processing capacity.

Yet the reprieve is not a rollback. The deal is narrow in scope and time-limited; it reduces short-term vulnerability but does not eliminate Beijing’s underlying leverage. The strategic imperative for the U.S. remains the same: accelerate domestic refining, strengthen allied processing hubs (Australia, Japan, South Korea), and make supply-chain resilience a genuine national project rather than an episodic talking point.

China and Russia: an asymmetric partnership, not a vassalage

It’s tempting to reduce the China–Russia relationship to a straightforward story of Chinese control and Russian dependence. The truth is messier. Beijing has become economically indispensable to Moscow — buying energy, selling technology and goods, and offsetting Western pressure — but that does not translate into absolute political control over Kremlin decision-making. Russian strategic culture, domestic political dynamics, and Putin’s own calculations mean Moscow retains agency; China’s leverage is real, but it has limits and costs. Push too hard, and Beijing risks alienating a partner it values for geopolitical balance.

Empirically, China remains a major buyer of Russian energy (a critical revenue stream for Moscow), and Chinese exports to Russia surged after 2022 — all of which complicates Western attempts to isolate or punish Russia without accounting for Beijing’s calculations. But those same energy and trade ties are not an on/off switch for Russian policy in Ukraine. The evidence suggests China can enable and restrain simultaneously, but it cannot unilaterally dictate Russian strategic choices.

The emerging architecture of confrontation — and what it looks like in practice

We are not, yet, in a new Cold War with neat blocs and iron curtain economics. Instead, we are sliding into a polycentric era of competition where economic interdependence, regional coalitions, and technological rivalry coexist uneasily with political and military friction. The Trump-Xi handshake is therefore best seen as tactical: hedging against worst-case supply disruptions, advancing narrow commercial interests, and testing whether bilateral management can contain broader systemic risks.

At the same time, European leaders and other U.S. partners face real planning challenges: inconsistent U.S. policy signals complicate defense planning and trade strategy; China’s selective cooperation complicates sanctions regimes; and Russia’s unpredictability keeps contingency planning expensive. The result is a world in which coalition management, diplomatic nimbleness, and industrial policy are rising to the top of national security toolkits.

Policy implications — what would Washington and its partners do next?

• Treat rare-earths and other strategic minerals as national security priorities: subsidize refining, build allied capacity, and set procurement rules that incentivize resilience.
• Move from episodic summitry to binding frameworks: bilateral statements are useful; durable agreements (on trade, export-control coordination, crisis hotlines) are better.
• Calibrate China policy to recognize asymmetry: pressure Beijing where leverage exists (e.g., export controls, investment rules) while preparing for scenarios in which Beijing deliberately hedges its support for Moscow.
• Improve transatlantic and Indo-Pacific policy coordination to reduce the costs of unpredictability in U.S. policy and to align responses to resource coercion and hybrid threats.

Conclusion — a transitional moment, not a destination

The recent diplomatic flurry produced useful tactical wins — rare-earth supply breathing room, fresh channels of engagement in Asia — but it did not erase the structural drivers of rivalry. China’s relationship with Russia complicates any simple narrative of pressure or capitulation; U.S. diplomatic reengagement can reset short-term risk but not permanently remove long-term dependencies. The most likely near-term outcome is continued competition with intermittent cooperation, where resource politics, trade policy, and geopolitical signaling interact in high-stakes ways. The central question for policymakers and publics is whether they will use the runway that diplomacy buys to build real, systemic resilience — or whether the world will lurch again from crisis to crisis.