By Ephraim Agbo
Taiwan’s announcement of a T$1.25 trillion (roughly $39.9–$40 billion) supplementary defence package is a clear political signal: Taipei intends to accelerate capability buys — drones, missiles, missile-defence, and other asymmetric systems — to blunt Beijing’s growing pressure. But history, logistics, budgets and geopolitics say signalling and money are not the same as being ready. Below I lay out why the plan could be a genuine stretch for Taiwan, what the key bottlenecks are, and the plausible scenarios that follow.
What Taipei has promised — and why that matters
President Lai framed the package as a benchmark of “determination” and a step toward a long-term target of ~5% of GDP for defence spending by 2030; the $40B special budget will push 2026 spending up to roughly 3.3% of GDP. The package explicitly prioritizes high-tempo purchases (U.S. arms and off-the-shelf systems), plus further investment in drones, shore-based missiles and air/missile-defence.
Those are the right headline priorities if your strategic aim is denial and deterrence — but they are also among the hardest to execute quickly and cheaply.
The operational reality: China’s pressure is intensifying
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leadership and multiple monitoring bodies have argued Chinese exercises around Taiwan increasingly look like rehearsals for blockade or invasion — not routine drills. PLA air and naval activity across the Taiwan Strait median line and into Taiwan’s ADIZ has risen year-on-year: independent trackers and Taipei’s Ministry of Defence recorded sharp increases in sorties and coordinated naval activity through 2023–2025. That operational tempo creates a high, continuous demand on Taiwan’s air defences, sea surveillance and readiness posture.
Why money alone is insufficient — four hard bottlenecks
A. Procurement lead times and technology transfer
Many of the most useful items Taipei wants — mobile long-range missiles, modern surface-to-air systems, integrated coastal defence, and high-end ISR — are complex systems that take years to deliver, integrate and sustain. Even if contracts are approved fast, ships, missiles and airframes must be integrated into command networks, trained crews must be formed, and supply chains built. The $40B buys capability on paper; fielding effectiveness takes time.
B. Industrial base and sustainment
Taiwan’s defence industrial base has strengths (notably in certain domestic missiles, electronics and drones), but it cannot instantly produce large quantities of heavy platforms or many sophisticated subsystems. Dependence on foreign suppliers (chiefly U.S. systems and components) creates choke points — politically (arms approvals) and logistically (production queues). If the U.S. or other suppliers slow approvals or deliveries, Taiwan’s accelerated purchasing plan will face limits.
C. Human capital and training
High-tech systems demand trained operators, maintenance crews and resilient command-and-control. Rapidly expanding inventories without proportional investments in training and maintenance risks having platforms that exist but cannot be employed effectively under stress. Learning to operate complex integrated air defences and networked ISR in contested electromagnetic environments is not a short course — it is measured in years.
D. Economic & political trade-offs
Pushing defence spending toward 5% of GDP will stress public finances and political tolerance. Taiwan faces competing demands — social spending, economic stimulus, and a technology-heavy export economy that also depends on cross-strait trade. Overcommitment could produce domestic backlash or reduce long-term economic resilience that underpins any sustained defence effort. The PR messaging from Beijing accusing Taiwan of “squandering funds” underscores the political contest at home.
Geopolitics: a fragile external safety net
Two complicating geopolitical facts increase Taipei’s vulnerability:
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U.S. support is decisive but not guaranteed in detail. Washington’s posture matters for deterrence and for Taiwan’s ability to acquire certain platforms quickly. The recent political changes in Washington have already affected the tempo of arms approvals and the political signalling underpinning them. Even with strong U.S. rhetoric, procurement and operational support can be inconsistent, and Taiwan cannot assume unconditional, immediate material intervention.
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Lessons from Ukraine are double-edged. Ukraine showed how a well-armed and resilient defender, aided by Western weapons and training, can impose high costs on an invader. But it also showed that modern interventions take time, heavy logistics and sustained allied coordination. For Taiwan, a maritime blockade or quick coercive operation by the PLA could aim to act faster than Western political and logistical systems can respond. In short — Ukraine’s lessons encourage resistance planning but also highlight the time-sensitivity of outside help.
Plausible futures: three scenarios
Best case — “Stretch succeeds”
Taiwan accelerates asymmetric buys (cost-effective missiles, large drone swarms, distributed anti-ship systems), rapidly fields resilient command networks, and allies streamline approvals and logistics. The PLA faces high costs and risk, and Beijing recalibrates to a slower coercion strategy. This requires exceptional execution, supply-chain cooperation, and no major political reversals in partners.
Middle case — “Partial parity, persistent risk”
Taiwan makes important gains in key areas (drones, shore missiles, stockpiles) but still struggles with sustained air defence, logistics and mass mobilization. The PLA retains the ability to conduct harassment, blockade, and severe coercion short of full invasion; Taipei survives but under constant pressure and higher economic and social strain.
Worst case — “Overstretched and exposed”
Procurement delays, training shortfalls, and logistical bottlenecks mean many platforms are late or under-used. Beijing’s sustained pressure, combined with effective blockade tactics and a selective escalation campaign, achieves coercive political outcomes (economic pain, diplomatic isolation) before Taiwan’s defenses and international support can stabilize the crisis.
Given the operational tempo of PLA activity and procurement realities, the middle and worst cases are plausible unless Taipei and its partners explicitly design for speed and resilience now.
Policy implications and priorities for closing the gap
If Taiwan’s leadership accepts the risk that the program could be a stretch, the most practical near-term steps are not just buying more hardware but reshaping how it buys, trains and protects itself:
- Prioritise distributed, survivable systems over single high-value platforms. Mobile missiles, hardened and dispersed C2 nodes, and inexpensive drones can complicate an adversary’s campaign and are faster to deploy than new aircraft or ships.
- Accelerate force-multiplier procurement and stockpiling. Invest in munitions stockpiles, rapid-reload coastal batteries, decoy systems, and electronic warfare capabilities to sustain a fight in the early, critical days of a crisis.
- Expand whole-of-society resilience. Civil defence, energy redundancy, and logistics resilience blunt coercive effects of blockades or strikes; Ukraine’s experience shows societal resilience matters as much as military hardware.
- Deepen and formalise supply and training pipelines with partners. Fast-track training rotations, pre-positioned spare parts, and streamlined export approvals from allies to cut fielding time. Political assurances alone are not enough; operational arrangements and legal channels are required.
Bottom line
Taiwan’s $40 billion supplemental package is a serious — and necessary — escalation in effort. But the scale of Beijing’s preparations, the pace of PLA operations, and the realities of procurement, training and sustainment make it quite plausible the program will stretch Taiwan’s capacities. Unless Taipei and its partners focus equally on rapid fielding, resilience and supply-chain guarantees — not just headline acquisition totals — the island may improve its odds but remain exposed to high-risk coercion strategies that target speed, logistics and political will.
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