Seven years, two terms: Benin’s constitutional shift and what it means for African democracy and development

By Ephraim Agbo 

In mid-November 2025 Benin’s National Assembly approved a major constitutional reform that extends presidential and legislative terms from five to seven years and creates a new upper chamber — a Senate — in a vote widely reported as 90–19. The amendment keeps the two-term limit but must still be cleared by the Constitutional Court and is set to take effect after the April 2026 presidential election. At face value the package is technical; in practice it is a consequential inflection point for a country long regarded as one of West Africa’s more stable democracies.

“It’s not the number seven that should concern us so much as who controls the new institutions and how they are used.”

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From procedural change to political consequence

Benin’s vote is simultaneously orthodox and unsettling. Extending term lengths while preserving term limits can plausibly be defended as a way to give governments longer horizons to plan and implement complex development projects. But the amendment is packaged with the creation of a Senate expected to include former presidents and presidential appointees — a configuration critics say risks becoming a reservoir of executive influence after an incumbent leaves office. The parliamentary vote (reported 90–19) and the confirmed timetable — implementation only after the next election and subject to judicial review — make the move legally tidy. Its political optics and likely effects, however, are contentious.

The immediate political context: Talon, Wadagni and 2026

President Patrice Talon is completing his second five-year term and has publicly signalled he will not seek a third term. The ruling coalition has already rallied behind Finance Minister Romuald Wadagni as its candidate for April 2026, positioning a Talon-aligned successor at the heart of next year’s vote. Given that sequence — outgoing president, anointed successor, constitutional reform before exit — opponents and many observers worry the reforms could entrench an outgoing administration’s influence beyond its formal tenure. The narrative is especially sensitive because Benin’s post-1990 democratic reputation rests on orderly transfers of power and competitive pluralism.

“Longer terms without stronger checks on power risk trading policy continuity for weakened accountability.”

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The development argument — sensible reform or institutional sleight of hand?

Proponents of longer mandates advance a simple development logic: infrastructure, macroeconomic rebalancing, and institutional reforms often exceed a five-year horizon. Seven-year mandates reduce the political stop-start that can frustrate large capital projects and crucial regulatory overhauls. In fragile states, the argument goes, longer cycles allow technocrats to plan and deliver without constant electoral disruption.

But the trade-offs are real. Africa’s recent politics—where constitutional tinkering, judicial manipulation, or outright coups have reshaped leadership rules in several countries—shows that seemingly neutral institutional changes often coincide with efforts to reduce contestation. When term extensions are paired with newly appointive bodies, or when electoral competitiveness is already constrained, the result is frequently weaker oversight, lower public trust in institutions, and higher political risk — all of which blunt the potential development gains of longer policy horizons.

What donors, investors and citizens should watch

1. The Constitutional Court’s ruling. The amendment’s fate now hinges on judicial clearance. A robust, independent court will limit politicization; a pliant court will reinforce fears of engineered entrenchment.
2. How the Senate is composed and empowered. Technical language on the Senate’s appointment mechanism, legislative remit and oversight powers will determine whether it serves as meaningful revising chamber or as a post-presidential power base.
3. Electoral integrity in April 2026. Open candidate registration, impartial election management, and the absence of undue restrictions on opposition actors are essential signals that change remains democratic rather than merely procedural.
4. Civil-society space and media freedom. Independent watchdogs and journalists are the first-line guardians against subtle institutional capture; their ability to operate without intimidation will shape whether longer terms translate into better governance or weaker accountability.

Likely scenarios and their development consequences

• Managed continuity (probable): Court approval, a Talon-endorsed successor wins in 2026, the Senate is constituted largely with regime allies. Short-term stability could help push through state projects, but the risk is a progressive narrowing of checks that raises long-term governance and investment risks.

• Judicial or civic check: Legal challenges, protests or regional pressure (from ECOWAS/AU) force adjustments to the Senate’s design or delay implementation. This would create political uncertainty but preserve an opening for democratic contestation.

• Escalation of contestation: If opposition actors are shut out and civic grievances mount, political tensions could spike, harming economic confidence and disrupting project implementation — the exact opposite of the stated aims of longer horizons.

A regional mirror

Benin’s move should be read alongside a string of governance changes across West and Central Africa in recent years — from constitution rewriting to non-electoral transfers of power. Whether this episode becomes an isolated institutional tweak or part of a broader democratic drift depends on internal checks and external responses. Regional bodies and partners will face a familiar dilemma: engage constructively to secure development outcomes, or apply principled pressure to defend democratic norms — both routes carry trade-offs for citizens.

Conclusion — endgame: design matters more than duration

Benin’s amendment is a reminder that constitutional reform is not purely technical. The difference between a seven-year presidency that enables effective long-term policy and one that deepens authoritarian drift will not be decided by the calendar but by institutional design, judicial independence, electoral integrity, and civic space. For development partners and Beninese citizens alike, the pressing task is to hold discussions about structures and safeguards, not merely semantics about term length. If longer mandates are to be justified on development grounds, they must come with stronger, enforceable checks — otherwise longer terms risk delivering longer spells of weakened accountability.