El Fasher’s Fall: How a Siege Became a Slaughter — and Why the World Failed to Stop It

By Ephraim Agbo 

Late October 2025 saw the long-feared unraveling of Darfur’s tenuous protections. The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized El Fasher, North Darfur’s capital, after more than 500 days of siege. What followed — accounts of door-to-door killings, mass rapes, hospitals attacked and people executed for wearing the “wrong” clothes or appearing to support the army — reads like a replay of Darfur’s darkest moments. Aid agencies, the UN human-rights office and rights groups describe the events as mass atrocities that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity — and, in the strongest language used by some observers, acts that could rise to genocidal intent.

This is not just a local catastrophe. El Fasher’s fall exposes three interlocking failures: (1) the tactical and political trajectory of the RSF since 2023; (2) the grinding collapse of humanitarian access under siege conditions; and (3) the international community’s inability — and in some instances unwillingness — to translate warnings into preventive leverage. The result is a crisis that has already produced thousands of deaths and is swelling displacement figures by the day.

What happened — quickly, and then worse

The Sudan conflict began on 15 April 2023 as a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF led by Mohamed “Hemedti” Dagalo. The RSF, an evolution of the Janjaweed militias that terrorized Darfur in the 2000s, has since consolidated control over much of western Sudan and mounted a months-long siege around El Fasher. In late October 2025 the army withdrew from the city and the RSF moved in; reports and videos since then document extrajudicial killings, summary executions and targeted violence against communities perceived as opposed to RSF rule.

Field reports collected by Human Rights Watch and the UN rights office describe house-to-house operations, executions of people trying to flee, and attacks on medical facilities. Aid workers who reached nearby towns say the flow of people out of El Fasher has been far smaller than expected — a chilling sign that many remain trapped, unable or too frightened to risk the roads. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) warns that arrivals in Tawila are “alarmingly low” given the scale of the city’s population before the assault.

Human costs in numbers (what we can say with reasonable confidence)

Numbers are volatile in an unfolding catastrophe, but several independent trackers and agencies provide a converging picture: thousands killed in and around El Fasher in the immediate aftermath; tens of thousands displaced from the city to nearby towns such as Tawila; and a broader national crisis of displacement and hunger that predates the latest assault — by some tallies, more than 12–14 million people displaced since April 2023 and humanitarian needs measured in the tens of millions. These figures make Sudan one of the largest displacement crises in recent memory.

Why this should have been avoidable — and wasn’t

There were three clear missed opportunities to prevent El Fasher’s descent into mass violence.

First, the siege itself was visible and reported for months. The UN human-rights office repeatedly warned that El Fasher had been under a de facto blockade for over a year, with food and medical supplies cut off — a condition that turns any capture of the city into an instant humanitarian catastrophe. Repeated public warnings, however, were not matched by preventative diplomatic pressure sufficient to change RSF calculations.

Second, the conflict is heavily internationalised. External patrons and regional actors have leverage over the warring parties; accusations that Gulf states and others have provided material support to proxies — whether through equipment, financing or political cover — complicate efforts to enforce arms embargoes or sanctions. Public reports and UN briefings have increasingly identified external enablers whose continuing involvement reduced the cost of escalation for the RSF. That makes the politics of coercion far harder: press one backer and another may step in.

Third, diplomatic initiatives — such as the “Quad” roadmap and a US-led ceasefire proposal that envisions a three-month truce followed by a broader political process — repeatedly stalled or were rejected by one or both sides until too late. Leaked details indicate the army has been weighing a US plan that would create humanitarian pauses; but internal divisions inside Sudan’s Security and Defence Council, and hardened RSF ambitions after months of siege, meant that a viable lull in fighting never consolidated before the RSF moved on El Fasher.

The RSF’s tactical logic — and the risk of deliberate targeting

Analysts who track the conflict argue that the RSF’s campaign is not merely opportunistic territorial expansion but is shaped by an intention to consolidate control in Darfur and to punish communities seen as aligned with the SAF or with rival ethnic groups. Videos and survivor testimony show selective killings and ethnically charged language — patterns that are, at minimum, consistent with crimes against humanity and at worst indicative of ethnically targeted violence. That catalogue of abuses increases the legal and moral imperative for the international community to act.

Accountability: slow, imperfect — but not illusory

Accountability will be contested and protracted. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has recently secured convictions for figures linked to earlier Darfur atrocities, a precedent that rights advocates cite to argue that perpetrators will not have impunity forever. The UN and rights groups are already collecting witness statements and digital evidence; preservation of that evidence, protection of witnesses, and secure forensic work will be crucial if prosecutions are to be feasible down the line. But prosecutions take years, and they will not stop the next massacre unless accompanied by coercive political measures now.

What the international community can and must do — a pragmatic checklist

1. Secure and enforce humanitarian pauses where possible. The US-led truce proposals offer a framework; third-party guarantors with influence on the RSF and SAF must be mobilised to enforce pauses and protect corridors.
2. Target the supply chain. Freeze identifiable shipments, financial streams and commercial ties that materially sustain the RSF — and name the companies and intermediaries involved. Public naming increases reputational costs and can reduce the flow of materiel.
3. Scale rapid protection for civilians. More support — mobile clinics, protection teams, and airlifted medical supplies — must reach Tawila and other reception areas now, matched by rapid refugee support in neighbouring countries.
4. Preserve evidence and protect witnesses. Fund and speed up UN and NGO documentation teams; protect those fleeing with critical testimony. Early evidence collection is the backbone of future justice.

Conclusion — warning lights blazing

El Fasher’s fall should force a reckoning: a siege that was visible months in advance became a slaughter because warnings were not translated into binding action. The tools exist — diplomatic leverage, targeted sanctions, humanitarian corridors, and judicial mechanisms — but political will has lagged. If the international community cannot act now to secure safe passage, protect civilians and choke off external enabling, the human cost will expand beyond the tragic statistics already reported.