By Ephraim Agbo
On the morning of 21 November 2025, gunmen swept into St. Mary’s Catholic boarding school in Papiri, Agwara local government area, Niger State. Verification efforts produced varying tallies — the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) confirmed a revised count of 303 pupils and 12 teachers in a head count, while other international tallies reported figures in the low-200s — but the human fact is the same: hundreds of children were taken from dormitories meant for rest and study. The abduction is both a humanitarian catastrophe and a signal flare for a multi-layered national security crisis.
“Hundreds of children were taken from dormitories meant for rest and study — the abduction is a signal flare for a multi-layered national crisis.”
A pattern, not an accident
This attack sits in a recent string of high-profile operations: days earlier attackers seized 25 girls from a school in Kebbi State and other raids on churches and villages produced deaths and abductions. The operational signature is familiar — pre-dawn hostel strikes, communications cut, lone guards neutralised, and rapid exfiltration along bush corridors — indicating repeatable tradecraft rather than isolated opportunism. International reporting traces a common playbook across these incidents.
“The repeatable tradecraft suggests organised networks treating mass abduction as an efficient, lucrative tactic — not a one-off crime.”
Why schools are strategic targets
Three converging incentives explain the logic:
- Concentration of victims. Boarding schools concentrate large numbers of vulnerable children.
- Monetary motive. Kidnap-for-ransom has evolved into a structurally embedded economy; official and investigative reporting place ransom-related flows at very high levels, making mass abduction a high-yield enterprise.
- Political and symbolic leverage. Mass abductions force national and international attention and can be used for bargaining or publicity.
When those incentives meet porous rural security and weak intelligence fusion, the operating environment becomes permissive.
“Kidnap-for-ransom has evolved into a structurally embedded economy that funds weapons, mobility and sanctuaries.”
The wider battlefield — bandits, jihadists, communal tensions and regional spillover
The St. Mary’s raid cannot be understood in isolation:
- Armed banditry & kidnapping: Loosely organised criminal gangs dominate remote corridors and finance operations through ransom.
- Jihadist insurgency & Sahel spillover: Jihadi groups in the northeast remain active; regional dynamics are changing as Sahelian groups and transnational networks find new routes for fighters, recruits and financing. In late October 2025 an Al-Qaeda–linked Sahel group, JNIM, claimed what has been reported as its first confirmed attack inside Nigeria, signalling possible Sahel-to-Nigeria expansion and new cross-border dynamics. That expansion raises the risk of jihadi actors layering onto the existing bandit economy.
- Inter-communal conflict: Pastoralist–farmer clashes, amplified by climate stress and resource competition, create local grievance lines that can be exploited by criminal actors.
- Regional fracture: Nigeria's internal crises are compounded by a deteriorating regional security situation. The withdrawal of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has disrupted crucial military cooperation and created safe havens for armed groups to regroup and recruit . This fragile landscape has allowed groups like JNIM, one of the most powerful extremist groups in Africa, to make inroads .
“Sahelian groups expanding influence into Nigeria offer new finance and sanctuary options that can merge with the ransom economy.”
Infiltration and compromise: a corrosive vulnerability
A politically explosive and operationally critical thread is infiltration, collusion or corruption within political and security structures. Specific allegations and investigative leads — arrests, warnings by national security organs, and independent reporting — point to instances where insiders either profited from or turned a blind eye to criminal activity. These are not institutional indictments but concrete vulnerabilities that can:
- Leak operational plans and warning intelligence;
- Channel arms, fuel and transport to non-state actors; and
- Protect financiers and brokers within formal networks.
If accurate, infiltration undermines trust, degrades intelligence fusion and preserves the ransom market that feeds mass abductions. This thread demands transparent probes and public accountability.
In mid-November, jihadist fighters claimed they had captured and executed a senior Nigerian officer — Brigadier-General Musa Uba, commander of a task force operating in the Lake Chad / Borno theatre — after an ambush on a patrol in northeastern Borno State. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) publicly claimed responsibility and released a statement and images; President Bola Tinubu later confirmed the death even as the military initially issued denials. The killing of a brigade commander marks an alarming escalation: it signals both the operational reach and the brazenness of jihadist cells, and it has deep implications for morale, command cohesion and public confidence in the armed forces.
“The killing of Brig. Gen. Musa Uba marks an alarming escalation — it exposes jihadi reach, corrodes morale and raises urgent questions about command and cohesion.”
The religious perspective: grief, pastoral care, unity — and political risk
Religious leaders and bodies are among the first responders in these crises. Their perspective is multi-dimensional: pastoral (comfort, prayer, trauma support), civic (demands for protection and accountability), and political (narratives that can either calm or inflame).
Christian leaders. CAN officials travelled to St. Mary’s, publicly condemned the raid, and criticised authorities for reopening schools without verified security clearances — framing the attack as both a moral outrage and a governance failure. Church networks mobilise pastoral care, shelters for families, and fundraising for immediate needs while pressing for transparent rescue efforts.
“The attack is a moral outrage — and reopening schools without verified security clearances is a governance failure.” — CAN local leadership.
Muslim leaders. Major Muslim bodies and traditional authorities, including the Sultan’s Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), have condemned recent school abductions as “heartless and avoidable” and called for urgent government action and improved security coordination. Muslim leaders emphasise that the violence cuts across religious lines and appeals for unity and protection for all children are frequent.
“The recurring abduction of schoolgirls is tragic and utterly avoidable — security gaps must be closed now.” — JNI / Sultan of Sokoto.
Interfaith response and the danger of sectarian framing. Interfaith groups and clergy regularly call for restraint, joint investigative cooperation, and pastoral solidarity. They warn that politicised or sectarian narratives — including claims of targeted “genocide” or religious cleansing — risk inflaming tensions and complicating rescue and reconciliation. Instead, many faith leaders urge a unity-based response: pastoral care for victims, coordinated pressure on authorities, and public insistence on transparent investigations.
“Religious leaders urge unity and restraint — politicisation risks inflaming tensions at a time when coordinated action is needed.”
On-the-ground role: Churches and mosques often provide trauma counselling, assist families with logistics and fundraising, and serve as focal points for community-led early-warning and local protection efforts. Their authority and networks can help build community-anchored protection systems — but only if political leaders and security services partner with, rather than marginalise, local religious actors.
The ransom economy — the structural engine
The mass abduction of students is not a new tactic, but it has evolved into a sophisticated criminal enterprise. The staggering sum of 2.23 trillion naira (approximately $1.55 billion) was netted from kidnappings last year alone, illustrating a well-funded illicit economy . Schools are targeted as "soft targets" that offer a high-yield, low-risk payoff .
This business model is fueled by a cycle of payment and impunity. As one risk advisor noted, "You cannot defeat an insurgency if you don’t have the trust of the local population," a trust that has been broken over years of violence and inadequate government response . The official strategy has often been reactive, with promises of rescue and military deployment after the fact, rather than addressing the root causes or effectively disrupting the kidnappers' financial networks
“Every negotiated release risks validating the business model — disrupting ransom flows is as crucial as any rescue.”
State response, credibility and diplomatic pressure
Official responses typically combine emergency deployments with public condemnations. But capacity constraints, intelligence fusion failures, and the political pressure to perform produce short-term operations rather than durable prevention. Simultaneously, heightened international attention — including diplomatic pressure and contested narratives about who is being targeted — increases the political stakes for Abuja’s messaging and decisions.
“Publish forensic timelines and restore accountability — families deserve to know who knew what and when.”
What investigators and policymakers must prioritise now
- Trace the money. Map ransom flows, intermediaries and laundering routes; target brokers and payment conduits.
- Probe infiltration. Launch transparent investigations into allegations of collusion within political and security structures; publish findings and prosecute wrongdoing.
- Strengthen interfaith, community protection. Leverage religious networks to build early-warning systems, trauma support and school hardening — with oversight and integration into national command structures.
- Disrupt supply chains. Target fuel, arms and transport brokers who fuel raids.
- Rebuild regional cooperation. Coordinate intelligence with neighbours to deny cross-border sanctuaries.
Pull quote (policy): “Trace and choke the money — map ransom flows and dismantle the financial conduits that sustain these crimes.”
Likely short-term outcomes
Absent decisive action, the likely scenarios are: negotiated releases (which risk entrenching ransom logic), risky military rescues (with uncertain human costs), or protracted captivity for many hostages (deepening trauma and school dropouts). Each path carries political and moral costs.
“Negotiated releases may save children now — but they can entrench the ransom logic that funds tomorrow’s raids.”
Bottom line
St. Mary’s is a human tragedy and a diagnostic moment. It reveals the convergence of a well-funded ransom economy, expanding regional jihadi influence, local communal fractures, and institutional weaknesses — including the dangerous possibility of infiltration within security and political structures. Religious leaders play a double role: they are pastoral first responders and civic watchdogs; their unity — if preserved — can be a force for protection and restraint. Addressing the crisis requires politically difficult choices: choke ransom pipelines, probe and purge infiltration, harden schools with community protection, build interoperable intelligence, and revive regional cooperation. Without that mix, Nigeria risks repeating the cycle — paying in lost childhoods, broken communities, and eroded public trust.
“Unless the state chokes the ransom pipeline and roots out infiltration, Nigeria will keep paying in lost childhoods and eroded trust.”
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