September 28, 2025

Netanyahu at the UN: War Cry, Statesmanship, or Something in Between?


By Ephraim Agbo 

Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2025 UN General Assembly address was simultaneously theatrical and transactional — an appeal to domestic constituencies, a direct coercive message to Hamas and Gaza, and a diplomatic strike at Western capitals that recognised Palestinian statehood. The speech reused a long-standing Netanyahu toolbox (maps and theatrical props), but landed in a radically different legal and diplomatic environment than past UN interventions: after ICJ provisional measures and ICC action, geopolitical costs for provocative rhetoric are higher and more immediate.


Historic theatricality — Netanyahu’s UN style in context

Netanyahu has repeatedly used visual props and dramatic staging at the UN to compress complex threats into single, shareable images. The most famous precedent is his 2012 “cartoon bomb” moment — he held up a drawing of a bomb and literally drew a red line to dramatize how close Iran was to a nuclear weapon. That act changed how his speeches were covered worldwide and is a recognized element of his rhetorical playbook: make the threat visible and memorable.

In 2025 he returned to that playbook with a map he labelled “THE CURSE” (and other visual hooks like QR codes in the hall) — the same strategic logic: visual condensation of a threat and a play for virality. The novelty this year was the pairing of theatrical UN rhetoric with immediate battlefield-directed messaging — notably, Israel’s decision to broadcast the speech toward Gaza by loudspeaker, an explicit attempt to treat words as a field weapon. That combination blurred the line between international diplomacy and direct psychological warfare.


The legal and institutional backdrop: why this speech landed differently in 2025

Two legal developments frame every utterance now:

  1. ICJ provisional measures in the “Gaza genocide” case. South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the ICJ’s provisional measures (ordered in 2024) place a legal obligation on Israel to take steps to prevent acts that could amount to genocide and to enable humanitarian access. That judicial context means UN statements about the campaign in Gaza are not only rhetorical — they are being read by judges and prosecutors.

  2. ICC prosecutorial action. The International Criminal Court’s situation in the State of Palestine has proceeded into warrants and pre-trial steps (the ICC issued warrants in 2024–25 against senior Israeli figures). That creates practical travel and reputational consequences for Israeli leaders and makes every high-profile public intervention a potential piece of prosecutorial record. The very routing of Netanyahu’s flight to avoid some European airspace — widely reported — is a concrete signal of that changed legal environment.

Put simply: in 2012 a dramatic UN visual aimed mainly at shifting political opinion. In 2025 similar theatricality carries immediate legal and mobility costs — and is processed through tribunals evaluating whether conduct amounts to international crimes.


Rhetorical architecture: audiences and instruments

Netanyahu’s speech operated on three concentric audiences, each served by different techniques:

  • Domestic audience (primary): The rhetorical goal is to consolidate support and inoculate domestic opinion against calls for compromise. Phrases like “finish the job” and “murdering Jews pays off” function as rallying refrains — short, morally absolute lines that reduce political complexity into binary moral claims and motivate a political base.

  • Adversary audience (Hamas/Gaza): The broadcast into Gaza via loudspeakers (and reported phone messaging attempts) turned the UN podium into a battlefield microphone. The direct commands — “lay down your arms…free the hostages” — were framed as both offer and threat. That is strategic communications applied as coercion: attempt to split the governed population from its armed rulers and induce capitulation.

  • International/diplomatic audience (UN, Western capitals): The public shaming of states that recognised Palestine (Britain, France, Canada, Australia and others in the week before the UN session) reframed recognition as a moral error that “rewards terror,” a deliberate attempt to delegitimize their action and to signal that Israel sees bilateral support as the key axis of legitimacy. 

Each audience received a calibrated message; the risk is that satisfying one (domestic base) may significantly alienate others (European partners, UN members, and legal institutions).


Historical parallels and differences (short comparative table)

  • 2012 “Red line” cartoon bomb (Iran): Visual dramatization of a future threat meant to influence policy choices (not intended for a direct battlefield). Outcome: intense media buzz, mixed diplomatic effect.
  • 2025 “CURSE” map + loudspeakers (Gaza): Visual dramatization + direct dissemination to an occupied population under attack. Outcome: immediate diplomatic walkouts and legal scrutiny in an era of ICJ/ICC action.

The difference is not only the content but the operational environment: 2012’s drama was pre-emptive warning; 2025’s drama amplifies and justifies an ongoing kinetic campaign, with more immediate normative consequences.


The political calculus — why Netanyahu doubled down

Three linked incentives explain the tone and content:

  1. Electoral and coalition pressures at home. Netanyahu’s political survival has repeatedly hinged on security credibility. After October 7 and a long war, a hawkish posture is politically salient.
  2. Deterrence logic. By promising to “finish the job,” Israel signals high cost to adversaries. This is aimed at Hezbollah, Iranian proxies, and other actors balancing the calculus of escalation.
  3. Delegitimizing opponents internationally. By framing recognition of Palestine as a “reward for terror,” Netanyahu tries to reframe diplomatic moves by friends and foes alike as moral failures — an effort to shape a narrative that limits pressure for ceasefires or change. Reuters and other outlets recorded these lines and the list of countries whose recognition he attacked.

These incentives produce a speech that is high reward domestically but high-risk internationally.


6) Strategic and normative consequences — three scenarios

  1. Short-term tactical success, long-term diplomatic isolation. A maximal military campaign could erode Hamas’s capacity and even produce tactical successes, but will likely deepen Israel’s isolation in multilateral fora and increase legal exposure (ICJ/ICC processes).

  2. International legal escalation. The speech and the campaign now feed into dossiers at the ICJ and ICC. Public statements, props and operational broadcasts are evidentiary inputs for international and domestic actors assessing intent and proportionality. That does not decide guilt, but it hardens the legal and reputational record.

  3. Fragmented Western coalition. Some capitals will double down on bilateral support; others will move toward symbolic and substantive detachment (recognition of Palestine, sanctions, or legal posturing). Multiple Western recognitions the week before the speech is evidence of that fracturing.


Humanitarian and governance blind spots

Netanyahu’s speech was explicit about military aims and implicit about political end-states. Critical absences:

  • Post-conflict governance: No credible plan for Gaza’s civil administration, reconstruction or de-radicalisation was provided — yet those are essential to prevent a repeat of insurgency.
  • Humanitarian mechanics: The rhetoric did not offer operational measures to guarantee sustained humanitarian corridors consistent with ICJ provisional measures, which could further complicate legal compliance and international cooperation. ICJ orders and humanitarian commentary make these gaps consequential.

8) What historians will note

Four lines a historian is likely to highlight:

  1. The continued use of theatrical props by Netanyahu as a signature rhetorical tactic (2012 bomb → 2025 “CURSE”).
  2. The fusion in 2025 of theatre with direct operational messaging (broadcast into Gaza) — a sign of how public diplomacy and psychological operations have merged.
  3. The speech’s timing amid legal processes at the ICJ and ICC — a rare moment where UN rhetoric and international adjudication overlap intensely.
  4. The diplomatic fallout from Western recognitions of Palestine — a pivot point showing how prolonged conflict can reorder traditional alliances.

Final take

Netanyahu’s address was effective theatre — compact, viral, and domestically potent. But theatre in the UN agora now surfaces in a transformed legal and diplomatic ecosystem. Visual props and blistering rhetoric that once mainly reshaped public opinion now enter judicial archives and influence state behaviour in ways that could have lasting consequences for Israel’s access, alliances, and legal exposure.

So then, the imperative is threefold: (1) treat public rhetoric as a strategic variable (not mere words), (2) craft parallel legal/diplomatic messaging to mitigate tribunal and ally fallout, and (3) insist on operational plans for governance and humanitarian access that can be implemented post-hostilities. Without those, rhetoric will increasingly harden the adverse scenarios this piece sketches.


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Netanyahu at the UN: War Cry, Statesmanship, or Something in Between?

By Ephraim Agbo  Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2025 UN General Assembly address was simultaneously theatrical and transactional — an app...