“Better Together” at 80 — An analysis on Amina Mohammed’s UNGA interview and what it means for multilateralism

By Ephraim Agbo 

Amina J. Mohammed used her BBC interview at the 80th UN General Assembly to do three things at once: diagnose a weakened international peace architecture, point toward practical levers for greater accountability (especially around Security Council behavior), and insist that development and peace must be financed and operationalized together. Her argument is not moralizing; it’s systems-level: institutions built in 1945 are straining under 21st-century geopolitics, and the human cost of that strain—most visibly in Sudan, the DRC and Gaza—requires a combination of political pressure, technical fixes, and targeted investment. The stakes are not abstract: they affect how billions of development and humanitarian dollars are spent and whether core UN tools (sanctions, mediation, peacekeeping, development finance) are used effectively.

The institutional diagnosis: what Mohammed called a “loss of value” in peace

Mohammed’s blunt formulation — that “peace seems to be a word, a five-letter word, that is losing its value” — should be read as institutional critique rather than rhetorical flourish. Her point: the UN’s core peace tools (Security Council-mandated action, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking) are not delivering predictable outcomes because political gatekeepers (the P5; interested external funders; regional spoilers) often block coherent responses. That failure has two practical consequences:

• Resource diversion. Instead of investing in prevention, states and multilateral actors spend huge sums reacting to protracted conflict. Mohammed repeatedly tied the SDGs and peace together: without stable politics, investments in health, education and climate adaptation are eaten by crisis response.

• Erosion of normative authority. High-profile vetoes and the inability to enforce ceasefires weaken global rules and public faith in multilateral problem-solving; this is one reason civil society and middle powers have stepped into the breach with pressure campaigns. The practical effect is less predictable crisis management and more protracted suffering for civilians.

The veto, paralysis and the political economy of inaction

Mohammed’s focus on the Security Council is tactical: reform is politically fraught, but the immediate lever is accountability—using General Assembly processes and public votes to shame or isolate intransigent actors. Two analytical points are important:

• The veto is both a procedural tool and a political signal. Recent high-stakes vetoes have reinforced perceptions that a single P5 member can shield allies from collective measures—even when nearly all other council members support action. That dynamic turns the Council from an engine for collective security into a site of strategic blocking. The practical consequence: the General Assembly, emergency special sessions and public diplomacy become de facto instruments to register global majorities even when the Council stalls.

• Accountability via transparency works—sometimes. Public roll-call votes, NGO monitoring, and GA resolutions do not substitute for binding action, but they raise political costs domestically for governments that abstain or vote against humanitarian measures. Mohammed argues—and the recent GA practice confirms—that naming, shaming and political pressure can change behaviour or at least restrict the political space of spoilers. That is why she emphasizes “stand up and be counted.”

Analytical implication: short of Charter amendments, the UN can still recalibrate incentives. That requires using transparency, carefully targeted sanctions, referral mechanisms, and coordinated multilateral diplomacy to make veto-based obstruction politically costly.

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Case studies: Sudan and the DRC — a test of Mohammed’s prescription

Mohammed’s interview repeatedly returned to concrete theatres where institutional failure has tolls:

Sudan. Recent UN human-rights reporting documents a sharp rise in civilian deaths, widespread displacement and systematic sexual violence. The humanitarian footprint—millions displaced, health systems collapsing—means that standard UN instruments (statements, humanitarian appeals) are necessary but insufficient; what’s missing are enforceable, multilateral mechanisms that can stop the flows of arms, money and proxies that fuel the fighting. Mohammed’s insistence that external backers be called out directly is an operational prescription: identify supply lines, freeze assets, and build targeted diplomacy to cut funding flows.

DRC and other protracted conflicts. In states with multiple local and external actors, peace requires political settlements that include not just principal belligerents but financiers and regional enablers—precisely the actors whose influence is easiest to evade under current UN practices. Mohammed’s practical emphasis is on expanding the bargaining table and combining pressure with incentives for those funders to withdraw support.

Humanitarian dimension (sexual violence, children). Independent UN and NGO reports (UNICEF, Save the Children, Amnesty) confirm widespread sexual violence and extreme risks to children in these conflicts. Mohammed’s argument ties this human data to institutional reform: if the Security Council cannot act, the UN must ensure that its other tools (investigations, monitoring, referrals to courts, protective funding) are scaled up and funded.

Reform vs. adaptation: what to demand from member states now

Calls for Security Council reform (more seats, African permanent representation) are legitimate and politically popular in many capitals. But the politics are intractable: amending the Charter requires P5 consent—precisely the actors who benefit from the status quo. Mohammed’s stance—push for representation and internal fixes without necessarily reopening the Charter—is therefore strategically sensible.

Practical, medium-term reforms to prioritize now:

• Expand indirect accountability mechanisms: make abstention and vetoes accompany mandatory, public briefings explaining rationale; attach clear thresholds for emergency GA action when the Council is paralyzed.
• Strengthen regional UN-AU (African Union) ties for conflict mediation and peacekeeping — delegate authority where regional legitimacy and capacity exist.
• Create clearer, time-bound triggers for targeted sanctions and asset freezes against external backers discovered to be fueling conflict—so accountability is swift, not only rhetorical.

Financing prevention: the missing link between SDGs and peace

A central analytic thread in Mohammed’s remarks is fiscal: prevention is cheaper than response, but current budgetary incentives favor crisis managers (humanitarian appeals, emergency peacekeeping) over steady investments in governance, rule of law, and community resilience.

Key policy proposals that follow her logic:

• Reframe development finance to include peace-building returns in cost-benefit calculations—i.e., measure and report how investments in jobs, local justice systems and resilient services reduce future humanitarian spending.
• Use multilateral development banks and climate funds more deliberately as peace instruments (de-risk investments that promote local inclusion and employ youth), conditional on demonstrable reductions in conflict financing.

Strategic communications and public pressure: the democracy of multilateralism

Mohammed’s emphasis on “stand up and be counted” is also a communications strategy. If GA debates and public votes are broadcast and framed effectively, they create constituency pressure—citizens ask their governments “why did you abstain?”—and that political pressure can shift positions, or at least reduce impunity for obstruction. This is not a panacea, but it is a low-cost, high-leverage tool that the UN can use immediately.

What success would actually look like (operational yardsticks)

If Mohammed’s prescriptions are more than rhetoric, we should be able to measure success across short and medium timeframes:

Within 6–18 months

• Clear public explanations for every major Security Council veto or abstention; correlated increase in public debate and domestic scrutiny.
• Faster launches of targeted sanction regimes where WHO/UN/OHCHR investigations identify external enablers.

Within 2–5 years

• Pilot programmes that pair development finance with robust peace dividends (local jobs, justice mechanisms) in at least three conflict-affected countries, with metrics showing reduced recruitment and violence.
• A visible expansion of AU-UN joint mediation and peace support roles in at least one major African crisis.

Risk assessment: why Mohammed’s plan could stall

• Political resistance from P5: any attempt to make veto behavior politically costly can provoke counter-measures and even withdrawals from cooperative UN mechanisms.
• Fragmentation of global institutions: when bilateral alliances (or blocs) prefer parallel arrangements, they can bypass UN structures, undermining any GA-based accountability.
• Resource constraints: donors’ fatigue and competing crises (climate, pandemics, inflation) could starve prevention portfolios if policymakers don’t see clear short-term political dividends.

Conclusion — a pragmatic agenda for multilateral repair

Amina Mohammed’s critique is not an elegy for multilateralism but a roadmap: use transparency to raise costs for obstruction, pair development and prevention with clear funding mechanisms, and expand regional partnerships so action is locally legitimate and operationally faster. The alternative—accepting an ossified Security Council and ad hoc, expensive crisis management—ensures a steady conveyor belt of human suffering and fractured multilateral capacity.

If the 80th General Assembly is to mean anything practical, it will be judged by whether member states convert public accountability into concrete policy changes: tighter controls on conflict financing, smarter use of development finance for prevention, and measurable reductions in civilian harm in hotspots such as Sudan and the DRC. Until then, Mohammed’s interview is a useful wake-up call—but a wake-up call must be followed by governance choices that are visible, measurable and politically costly to reverse.